TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bulow,Jeremy
AU  - Levin,Jonathan
TI  - Matching and Price Competition
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 11506
PY  - 2005
Y2  - August 2005
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11506
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11506.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Jeremy I. Bulow
Stanford University
Graduate School of Business
Stanford, CA  94305-7298
Tel: 650/723-2160
Fax: 650/725-8916
E-Mail: jbulow@stanford.edu

Jonathan D. Levin
Stanford University
Department of Economics
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA  94305-6072
Tel: 650/723-5962
E-Mail: jdlevin@stanford.edu
M2  - featured in NBER digest on 2005-08-01
AB  - We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers.
Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implying
little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become
compressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust case
against the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results.
ER  -