TY  - JOUR
AU  - Ashenfelter,Orley
AU  - Bloom,David E.
TI  - Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 1149
PY  - 1983
Y2  - June 1983
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1149
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1149.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Orley C. Ashenfelter
Industrial Relations Section
Firestone Library
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ  08544
Tel: 609/258-4040
Fax: 609/258-2907
E-Mail: c6789@princeton.edu

David E. Bloom
Harvard School of Public Health
Department of Global Health and Population
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115
Tel: 617/432-0866
Fax: 617/432-6733
E-Mail: dbloom@hsph.harvard.edu
AB  - This paper analyzes and compares arbitrator behavior under conventional and final-offer arbitration. Simple models of arbitrator behavior are developed under each of these alternative mechanisms. These models are estimated and tested using data on the outcomes of both forms of arbitrationin New Jersey, a state in which arbitration is mandatory for unresolved pay disputes involving police officer unions and public employers. The major findings are (1) that the high proportion of union victories under final-offer arbitration were generated by a set of impartial arbitrators applying the same standards used in conventional arbitration, and (2) that union bargainers appear to be considerably more risk averse than employer bargainers, with the wage increases under final-offer arbitration having a lower mean and a lower variance than under conventional arbitration.
ER  -