TY  - JOUR
AU  - Alesina,Alberto
AU  - Angeletos,George-Marios
TI  - Corruption, Inequality and Fairness
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 11399
PY  - 2005
Y2  - June 2005
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11399
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11399.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alberto F. Alesina
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center 210
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-8388
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: aalesina@harvard.edu

George-Marios Angeletos
Department of Economics
MIT E52-251
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA  02142-1347
Tel: 617/452-3859
Fax: 617/253-1330
E-Mail: angelet@mit.edu
AB  - Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases.
ER  -