TY  - JOUR
AU  - Gawande,Kishore
AU  - Krishna,Pravin
AU  - Olarreaga,Marcelo
TI  - Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 11371
PY  - 2005
Y2  - May 2005
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11371
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11371.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Kishore Gawande
Bush School of Government
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX 77840-4220
E-Mail: kgawande@tamu.edu

Pravin Krishna
Johns Hopkins University
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: 202/663 5733
Fax: 202/663 7718
E-Mail: Pravin_Krishna@jhu.edu

Marcelo Olarreaga
Department of Political Economy
University of Geneva
Uni Mail, 102 Bd Carl-Vogt, CH-1211 Geneve 4
E-Mail: Marcelo.Olarreaga@ecopo.unige.ch
AB  - Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well-known Grossman-Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified suitably to account for the cross-sectoral use of inputs in production (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon with around 50 percent of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Data from more than 40 countries are used in our analysis. Our empirical results validate the predictions of the theoretical model with lobbying competition. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the“welfare-mindedness” of governments in setting trade policy.
ER  -