NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy

Kishore Gawande, Pravin Krishna, Marcelo Olarreaga

NBER Working Paper No. 11371
Issued in May 2005
NBER Program(s):   ITI

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well-known Grossman-Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified suitably to account for the cross-sectoral use of inputs in production (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon with around 50 percent of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Data from more than 40 countries are used in our analysis. Our empirical results validate the predictions of the theoretical model with lobbying competition. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the“welfare-mindedness” of governments in setting trade policy.

download in pdf format
   (218 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (218 K) or via email.

This paper was revised on May 14, 2009

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w11371

Published: By Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2012. "Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 115-132, 02.

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins w10205 Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy
Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga w14953 What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade
Bombardini and Trebbi w14771 Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?
Nunn and Trefler w12164 Putting the Lid on Lobbying: Tariff Structure and Long-Term Growth when Protection is for Sale
Grossman and Helpman w4149 Protection For Sale
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us