TY  - JOUR
AU  - Aghion,Philippe
AU  - Alesina,Alberto
AU  - Trebbi,Francesco
TI  - Choosing Electoral Rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 11236
PY  - 2005
Y2  - April 2005
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11236
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11236.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Philippe Aghion
Department of Economics
Harvard University
1805 Cambridge St
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-6675
Fax: 617/495-4341
E-Mail: paghion@fas.harvard.edu

Alberto F. Alesina
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center 210
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-8388
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: aalesina@harvard.edu

Francesco Trebbi
University of British Columbia
1873 East Mall
Vancouver, BC, V6T1Z1
Canada
Tel: 604.218.5900
Fax: 604.822.5915
E-Mail: ftrebbi@mail.ubc.ca
AB  - This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we show why majorities tend to adopt "winner-take-all" city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts. Single-member district rules serve this purpose. We show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model.
ER  -