NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions"

Daron Acemoglu

NBER Working Paper No. 11235
Issued in March 2005
NBER Program(s):   EFG   POL

In this essay I review the new book by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules. I also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w11235

Published: Acemoglu, Daron. "Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay On Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects Of Constitutions," Journal of Economic Literature, 2005, v43(4,Dec), 1025-1048.

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