@techreport{NBERw11156,
 title = "The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis",
 author = "Benjamin Chiao and Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "11156",
 year = "2005",
 month = "February",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w11156",
 abstract = {This paper empirically explores the procedures employed by standard-setting organizations. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2004), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and when there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker.},
}