The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis
This paper empirically explores the procedures employed by standard-setting organizations. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2004), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and when there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w11156
Published: Chiang, Benjamin, Josh Lerner, and Jean Tirole. "The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis" Rand Journal of Economics 38 (2007): 905 - 930.
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