NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The War Against Drug Producers

Herschel I. Grossman, Daniel Mejia

NBER Working Paper No. 11141
Issued in February 2005
NBER Program(s):   HE   PE

This paper develops a model of a war against the producers of illegal hard drugs. This war occurs on two fronts. First, to prevent the cultivation of crops that are the raw material for producing drugs the state engages the drug producers in conflict over the control of arable land. Second, to impede further the production and exportation of drugs the state attempts to eradicate crops and to interdict drug shipments. The model also includes an interested outsider who uses both a stick and a carrot to strengthen the resolve of the state in its war against drug producers. The results of the calibration of the model yield an estimate that from 2001 through 2003 subsidies from the United States to the Colombian armed forces under Plan Colombia caused a decrease in the exportation of drugs from Colombia to about 44 percent of what exportation was before Plan Colombia was implemented. The results of the calibration of the model also suggests that a more efficient allocation of the about $2 billion that the United States spent on Plan Colombia through 2003 would have involved larger subsidies to the conflict over control of arable land and smaller subsidies to eradication and interdiction efforts.

download in pdf format
   (316 K)

email paper

The NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health provides summaries of publications like this.  You can sign up to receive the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health by email.

This paper is available as PDF (316 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w11141

Published: Herschel Grossman & Daniel Mejía, 2008. "The war against drug producers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-23, January.

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Becker, Murphy, and Grossman w10976 The Economic Theory of Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs
Donohue, Ewing, and Peloquin w16776 Rethinking America's Illegal Drug Policy
Grossman w10601 Peace and War in Territorial Disputes
Miron w9689 The Effect of Drug Prohibition on Drug Prices: Evidence from the Markets for Cocaine and Heroin
Grossman, Chaloupka, and Brown w5713 The Demand for Cocaine by Young Adults: A Rational Addiction Approach
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us