TY  - JOUR
AU  - Razin,Assaf
AU  - Sadka,Efraim
TI  - Aging and the Welfare State: The Role of Young and Old Voting Pivots
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10967
PY  - 2004
Y2  - December 2004
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10967
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10967.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Assaf Razin
Department of Economics
Cornell University
Uris 422
Ithaca, NY 14853
Tel: 607/255-9625
Fax: 607/255-2818
E-Mail: ar256@cornell.edu

Efraim Sadka
Tel Aviv University
Eitan Berglas School of Economics
P.O.B. 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978, ISRAEL
E-Mail: sadka@post.tau.ac.il
AB  - An income tax is generally levied on both capital and labor income. The working young bears mostly the burden of the tax on labor income, whereas the retired old, who already acummulated her savings, bears the brunt of the capital income tax. Therefore, there arise two types of conflict in the determination of the income tax: the standard intragenerational conflict between the poor and the rich, and an ntergenerational conflict between the young and the old. The paper studies how aging affects the resolution of these conflicts, and the politico-economic forces that are at play: the changes in the voting pivots and the fiscal leakage from tax payers to transfer recipients.
ER  -