TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mishkin,Frederic S.
TI  - Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10829
PY  - 2004
Y2  - October 2004
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10829
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10829.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Frederic S. Mishkin
Columbia University
Graduate School of Business
Uris Hall 817
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
Tel: 212-854-3488
Fax: 212/662-8474
E-Mail: fsm3@columbia.edu
AB  - This paper asks the question: can central bank transparency go too far? Transparency is beneficial only when it serves to simplify communication with the public and helps generate support for central banks to conduct monetary policy optimally with an appropriate focus on long-run objectives. This paper argues that some suggestions for increased transparency, particularly a central bank announcement of its objective function or projections of the path of the policy interest rate, will complicate the communication process and weaken support for a central bank focus on long-run objectives. Transparency can indeed go too far. 
However, central banks can improve transparency in discussing that they do care about reducing output fluctuations . By describing procedures for how the path and horizon of inflation targets would be modified in the face of large shocks, by emphasizing that monetary policy will be just as vigilant in preventing inflation from falling too low as it is from preventing it from being too high, and by indicating that the central bank will pursue expansionary policies when output falls very far below potential, central banks can show that they do care about output fluctuations. These steps to improve transparency will increase support for the central bank's policies and independence, but avoid a focus on the short run that could interfere with the ability of the central bank to do its job effectively.
ER  -