TY  - JOUR
AU  - Krishna,Pravin
AU  - Mitra,Devashish
TI  - Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10826
PY  - 2004
Y2  - October 2004
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10826
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10826.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Pravin Krishna
Johns Hopkins University
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: 202/663 5733
Fax: 202/663 7718
E-Mail: Pravin_Krishna@jhu.edu

Devashish Mitra
Department of Economics
The Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs
133, Eggers Hall, Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY  13244
Tel: 315/443-6143
Fax: 315/443-3717
E-Mail: dmitra@maxwell.syr.edu
AB  - This paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country. When trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria - countries may both be protectionist or trade freely with each other. Starting with trade protection in both countries, a unilateral reform in one country is thus shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium (a self-enforcing state) that is consistent with majority voting in both countries.
ER  -