@techreport{NBERw10826,
 title = "Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting",
 author = "Pravin Krishna and Devashish Mitra",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "10826",
 year = "2004",
 month = "October",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w10826",
 abstract = {This paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country. When trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria - countries may both be protectionist or trade freely with each other. Starting with trade protection in both countries, a unilateral reform in one country is thus shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium (a self-enforcing state) that is consistent with majority voting in both countries.},
}