TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bebchuk,Lucian Arye
AU  - Fried,Jesse M.
TI  - Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10742
PY  - 2004
Y2  - September 2004
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10742
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10742.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
1545 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-3138
Fax: 617/812-0554
E-Mail: bebchuk@law.harvard.edu

jesse m. fried
E-Mail: jfried@law.berkeley.edu
AB  - This paper analyzes an important form of "stealth compensation" provided to managers of public companies. We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amount of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments. Our study highlights the significant role that camouflage and stealth compensation play in the design of compensation arrangements. Our study also highlights the significance of whether information about compensation arrangements is not merely publicly available but also communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders.
ER  -