NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Good Principals or Good Peers? Parental Valuation of School Characteristics, Tiebout Equilibrium, and the Effects of Inter-district Competition

Jesse Rothstein

NBER Working Paper No. 10666
Issued in August 2004
NBER Program(s):   ED   CH

School choice policies may improve productivity if parents choose well-run schools, but not if parents primarily choose schools for their peer groups. Theoretically, high income families cluster near preferred schools in housing market equilibrium; these need only be effective schools if effectiveness is highly valued. If it is, equilibrium effectiveness sorting' will be more complete in markets offering more residential choice. Although effectiveness is unobserved to the econometrician, I discuss observable implications of effectiveness sorting. I find no evidence of a choice effect on sorting, indicating a small role for effectiveness in preferences and suggesting caution about choice's productivity implications.

download in pdf format
   (508 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w10666

Published: Rothstein, Jesse M. "Good Principals Or Good Peers? Parental Valuation Of School Characteristics, Tiebout Equilibrium, And The Incentive Effects Of Competition Among Jurisdictions," American Economic Review, 2006, v96(4,Sep), 1333-1350.

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Bayer and McMillan w11802 Choice and Competition in Local Education Markets
Rothstein w11215 Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers? A Comment on Hoxby (2000)
Hoxby School Choice and School Productivity. Could School Choice Be a Tide that Lifts All Boats?
Hastings, Kane, and Staiger w11805 Parental Preferences and School Competition: Evidence from a Public School Choice Program
Hanushek and Rivkin Does Public School Competition Affect Teacher Quality?
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us