TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hunt,Jennifer
TI  - Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10510
PY  - 2004
Y2  - May 2004
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10510
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10510.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Jennifer Hunt
Department of Economics
Rutgers University
New Jersey Hall
75 Hamilton Street
New Brunswick
NJ, 08901-1248
Tel: (732) 932-7363
E-Mail: jennifer.hunt@rutgers.edu
AB  - I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents their own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment.
ER  -