NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition

Patrick Bajari, C. Lanier Benkard, Jonathan Levin

NBER Working Paper No. 10450
Issued in April 2004
NBER Program(s):   IO   PR

We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural parameters are estimated using the optimality conditions for equilibrium. The second step estimator is a simple simulated minimum distance estimator. The algorithm applies to a broad class of models, including I.O. models with both discrete and continuous controls such as the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model. We test the algorithm on a class of dynamic discrete choice models with normally distributed errors, and a class of dynamic oligopoly models similar to that of Pakes and McGuire (1994).

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w10450

Published: Patrick Bajari & C. Lanier Benkard & Jonathan Levin, 2007. "Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(5), pages 1331-1370, 09.

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