TY  - JOUR
AU  - Anderson,James E.
AU  - Zanardi,Maurizio
TI  - Political Pressure Deflection
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10439
PY  - 2004
Y2  - April 2004
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10439
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10439.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
James E. Anderson
Department of Economics
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
Tel: 617/552-3691
Fax: 617/552-2308
E-Mail: james.anderson.1@bc.edu

Maurizio Zanardi
ECARES, Universite' Libre de Bruxelles
E-Mail: mzanardi@ulb.ac.be
AB  - Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes --- political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.
ER  -