@techreport{NBERw10439,
 title = "Political Pressure Deflection",
 author = "James E. Anderson and Maurizio Zanardi",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "10439",
 year = "2004",
 month = "April",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w10439",
 abstract = {Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes --- political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.},
}