NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Political Pressure Deflection

James E. Anderson, Maurizio Zanardi

NBER Working Paper No. 10439
Issued in April 2004
NBER Program(s):   ITI

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes --- political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

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Published: James Anderson & Maurizio Zanardi, 2009. "Political pressure deflection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 129-150, October.

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