TY  - JOUR
AU  - Knight,Brian
TI  - Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power, and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the U.S. Senate
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10385
PY  - 2004
Y2  - March 2004
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10385
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10385.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Brian G. Knight
Brown University
Department of Economics, Box B
64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
Tel: 401/863-1584
Fax: 401/863-1970
E-Mail: Brian_Knight@brown.edu
AB  - While representation in the U.S. House is based upon state population, each state has an equal number (two) of U.S. Senators. Thus, relative to the state delegations in the U.S. House, small population states are provided disproportionate bargaining power in the U.S. Senate. This paper provides new evidence on the role of this small state bargaining power in the distribution of federal funds using data on projects earmarked in appropriations bills between 1995 and 2003. Relative to earmarks secured in House appropriations bills, Senate earmarks exhibit a small state advantage that is both economically and statistically significant. The paper also examines two theoretically-motivated channels through which this small state advantage operates: increased proposal power through appropriations committee representation and the lower cost of securing votes due to smaller federal tax shares. Taken together, these two channels explain over 80 percent of the measured small state bias. Finally, a welfare analysis demonstrates the inefficiency of hte measured small state bias.
ER  -