TY  - JOUR
AU  - Persson,Torsten
AU  - Roland,Gerard
AU  - Tabellini,Guido
TI  - How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies?
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10176
PY  - 2003
Y2  - December 2003
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10176
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10176.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Torsten Persson
Torsten and Ragnar Soderberg Chair in Economic Sci
Institute for International Economic Studies
Stockholm University
SE-106 91 Stockholm
SWEDEN
Tel: +46 8 163066
Fax: +46 8 6747801
E-Mail: Torsten.Persson@iies.su.se

Gerard Roland
UC Berkeley
Department of Economics
627 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
Tel: 510-642-4321
Fax: 510-642-6615
E-Mail: groland@econ.berkeley.edu

Guido Tabellini
IGIER Universita' Bocconi
Via Roentgen 1
20136 Milano
Italy
Tel: 39 2 583 6 3305; fax 3302
E-Mail: guido.tabellini@unibocconi.it
AB  - We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.
ER  -