NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Economic Insights from Internet Auctions: A Survey

Patrick Bajari, Ali Hortacsu

NBER Working Paper No. 10076
Issued in November 2003
NBER Program(s):   IO

This paper surveys recent studies of Internet auctions. Four main areas of research are summarized. First, economists have documented strategic bidding in these markets and attempted to understand why sniping, or bidding at the last second, occurs. Second, some researchers have measured distortions from asymmetric information due, for instance, to the winner's curse. Third, we explore research about the role of reputation in online auctions. Finally, we discuss what Internet auctions have to teach us about auction design.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w10076

Published: Bajari, Patrick and Ali Hortacsu. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions." Journal of Economic Literature XLII (2004): 457-486.

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