TY  - JOUR
AU  - Berman,Eli
TI  - Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10004
PY  - 2003
Y2  - September 2003
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10004
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10004.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Eli Berman
Department of Economics, 508
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA  92093
Tel: 858/534-2858
Fax: 858/534-7040
E-Mail: elib@ucsd.edu
AB  - Can rational choice modeling explain destructive behavior among the Taliban, Hama and other radical religious militias? This paper proposes a club good framework which emphasizes the function of voluntary religious organizations as efficient providers of local public goods in the absence of government provision. The sacrifices which these groups demand are economically efficient (as in Iannaccone (1992)) and make them well suited for solving the extreme principal-agent problems present in militia production. Thus the analysis can explain why religious radicals create such effective militias. Seemingly gratuitous acts of violence by group members destroy their outside options, increasing the incentive compatibility of loyalty. The analysis has clear implications for economic policy to contain militias.
ER  -