TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pakes,Ariel
AU  - Nitzan,Shmuel
TI  - Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 871
PY  - 1982
Y2  - March 1982
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0871
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0871.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Ariel Pakes
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Room 117
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-5320
Fax: 617/496-7352
E-Mail: apakes@fas.harvard.edu
AB  - This paper considers the problem of hiring scientists for research and development projects when one takes explicit account of the fact that the scientist may be able to use the information acquired during the project in a rival enterprise. Management's problem is to determine an optimum labor policy for its project. The policy consists of an employment decision and a labor contract. Given optimum behavior, it is straightforward to analyze the effect of the potential for mobility of scientific personnel on project profitability and on research employment. We also formalize conditions under which one would expect to observe a scientist leaving his employer to set up (or join) a rival.
ER  -