The Trade-Off between Wages and Employment in Trade Union Objectives
(280 K)
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NBER Working Paper No. 870
Issued in March 1982
NBER Program(s): LS
This paper demonstrates that, contrary to a widely-held opinion, the determination of the goals of unions is fully amenable to empirical analysis. A characterization of the wage and employment-setting process in unionized markets is adopted and its qualitative implications examined. The first-order condition for this model is fitted to time- series data on the newspaper industry from ten cities. The Inter- national Typographical Union 's objective function reveals very restricted opportunities for substituting wages for employment in response to a change in the slope of the employer's labor demand function. Larger union locals place greater emphasis on wages versus employment than smaller union locals.
Published: Pencavel, John H. "The Trade-off between Wages and Employment in Trade Union Objectives," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 99, May 1984, No. 2, pp . 215-232.
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