TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kaplan,Steven
TI  - The Holding Period Distinction of the Capital Gains Tax
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 762
PY  - 1981
Y2  - September 1981
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0762
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0762.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Steven N. Kaplan
Booth School of Business
The University of Chicago
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
Tel: 773/702-4513
Fax: 773/702-0458
E-Mail: steven.kaplan@chicagobooth.edu
AB  - United States tax law distinguishes between short-term and long-term capital gains. By taxing long-term gains at a lower rate the law creates an incentive for investors to postpone the realization of short-term gains. This study examines the lock-in effect induced by the differential tax treatment of long- and short-term gains. Analysis of data on corporate stock transactions from 1973 suggests that the lock-in effect is large and, thus, causes investors to alter their investment portfolios. The existence of such an effect is inefficient and results in a reduction in capital market efficiency. The inefficiency might be justified if there were convincing reasons which supported the existence of the holding period distinction. It is commonly argued, for instance, that eliminating the distinction would encourage short-term speculation at the expense of long-term commitment to capital. It is also claimed that this would result in a loss of revenue to the government. This study relies on IRS data and simulations using the NBER-TAXSIM file to examine the validity of these arguments. The results of this study suggest that the holding period distinction is not very effective in deterring speculation and does not increase government revenues; in fact, it may decrease them.
ER  -