TY  - JOUR
AU  - Polinsky,A. Mitchell
AU  - Shavell,Steven
TI  - Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 742
PY  - 1984
Y2  - April 1984
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0742
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0742.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Stanford University
Stanford, CA  94305
Tel: 650/723-0886
Fax: 650/723-3557
E-Mail: polinsky@stanford.edu

Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School
1575 Massachusetts Avenue
Hauser Hall 508
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-3668
Fax: 617/496-2256
E-Mail: shavell@law.harvard.edu
AB  - This paper examines how the optimal Pigouvian tax should be adjusted to reflect administrative costs. Several cases are examined, depending on whether the administrative costs are fixed per firm taxed or are a function of the amount of tax collected, and on whether such costs are borne by the government or by the taxed firm. In some cases, the presence of administrative costs increases the optimal tax above the external cost, while in other cases it leads to a decrease in the tax.
ER  -