TY  - JOUR
AU  - Green,Jerry R.
TI  - Wage-Employment Contracts   (Replaced by W0675)
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 623
PY  - 1981
Y2  - 1981
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0623
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0623.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Jerry R. Green
Harvard Business School
Baker Library 469
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
Tel: 617/495-6859
E-Mail: jgreen@hbs.edu
AB  - This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk. However, employment is above rather than below the efficient level when the conditions of profitability are worse than average. Such a one- period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as it is traditionally conceived.
ER  -