TY  - JOUR
AU  - Blinder,Alan S.
AU  - Gordon,Roger H.
AU  - Wise,Donald E.
TI  - Reconsidering the Work Disincentive Effects of Social Security
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 562
PY  - 1981
Y2  - June 1981
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0562
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0562.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alan S. Blinder
Department of Economics
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
Tel: 609/258-3358
Fax: 609/258-5398
E-Mail: blinder@princeton.edu

Roger H. Gordon
Department of Economics 0508
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, Dept. 0508
La Jolla, CA 92093
Tel: 858/534-4828
Fax: 858/534-7040
E-Mail: rogordon@ucsd.edu

Donald E. Wise
AB  - This paper shows that, contrary to commonly held views, the provisions of the social security law actually provide strong work incentives for older men. The reason is that, for most workers, higher current earnings lead to higher future social security benefits. These incentives have been particularly strong for workers under 65 years of age and, although they will be reduced somewhat when the 1977 amendments to the social security law become fully effective, they will remain substantial. The findings raise serious questions about recent econometric work attributing the decline in labor force participation rates of older men to the social security system.
ER  -