NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Strict Liability versus Negligence in a Market Setting

A. Mitchell Polinsky

NBER Working Paper No. 420 (Also Reprint No. r0119)
Issued in 1980
NBER Program(s):   LE

This paper formally analyzes strict liability and negligence in a market setting. The discussion emphasizes the impact of the rules on the market price and on the number of firms in the industry. For simplicity, the damage caused by each firm is assumed to be determined only by that firm's "care" (and not also by the firm's output or the victim's behavior).

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w0420

Published: Polinsky, A. Mitchell. "Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting ." The American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, (May 1980), pp. 363-367.

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