TY  - JOUR
AU  - Wolff,Edward N.
AU  - Hay,Joel
TI  - Educational Screening and Occupational Earnings
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 174
PY  - 1977
Y2  - April 1977
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0174
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0174.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Edward N. Wolff
Department of Economics
New York University
19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor
New York, NY  10012
Tel: 212/998-8917
Fax: 212/995-4186
E-Mail: edward.wolff@nyu.edu
AB  - The educational screening hypothesis states that beyond a certain point schooling functions as a signaling device to identify pre-existing talents. We test for the presence of screening by comparing the schooling and earnings of self-employed workers and of those employed by others in a sample set of occupations. We expect those employed by others to pursue additional schooling to signal prospective employers. We expect self-employed managers to acquire no additional schooling for signaling purposes. We expect other self-employed workers to obtain additional schooling to signal potential customers. Our empirical results, based on 1970 Census data, strongly support the case for screening. However, the relative magnitude of the screening portion of schooling is relatively modest, lying between approximately 5 and 10 percent.
ER  -