NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Deterministic and Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Experiments in Interdependent Security

Howard Kunreuther, Gabriel Silvasi, Eric T. Bradlow, Dylan Small

NBER Technical Working Paper No. 341
Issued in August 2007
NBER Program(s):   TWP

This paper examines experiments on interdependent security prisoner's dilemma games with repeated play. By utilizing a Bayesian hierarchical model, we examine how subjects make investment decisions as a function of their previous experience and their treatment condition. Our main findings are that individuals have differing underlying propensities to invest that vary across time, are affected by both the stochastic nature of the game and even more so by an individual's ability to learn about his or her counterpart's choices. Implications for individual decisions and the likely play of a person's counterpart are discussed in detail.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/t0341

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