TY  - JOUR
AU  - Gaynor,Martin
TI  - Misperceptions, Moral Hazard, and Incentives in Groups
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Technical Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 35
PY  - 1987
Y2  - May 1987
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/t0035
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/t0035.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Martin Gaynor
Heinz College
Carnegie Mellon University
4800 Forbes Avenue,,Room 3008
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
Tel: 412/268-7933
Fax: 412/268-5338
E-Mail: mgaynor@cmu.edu
AB  - Recent work has shown that, in the presence of moral hazard, balanced budget Nash equilibria in groups are not pareto-optimal. This work shows that when agents misperceive the effects of their actions on the joint outcome, there exist a set of sharing rules which balance the budget and lead to a pareto-optimal Nash equilibria.
ER  -