NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Adverse Selection in Health Insurance

David M. Cutler, Richard J. Zeckhauser

Chapter in NBER book Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 1 (1998), Alan M. Garber, editor (p. 1 - 32)
Published in January 1998 by MIT Press
in NBER Book Series Frontiers in Health Policy Research

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This chapter first appeared as NBER working paper w6107, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, David M. Cutler, Richard J. Zeckhauser
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