NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, George Triantis

Chapter in NBER book Concentrated Corporate Ownership (2000), Randall K. Morck, editor (p. 295 - 318)
Conference held May 31-June 1, 1998
Published in January 2000 by University of Chicago Press
© 2000 by the National Bureau of Economic Research

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