NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public: Private versus Social Optimality

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Luigi Zingales

Chapter in NBER book Concentrated Corporate Ownership (2000), Randall K. Morck, editor (p. 55 - 80)
Conference held May 31-June 1, 1998
Published in January 2000 by University of Chicago Press
© 2000 by the National Bureau of Economic Research

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