NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers

James G. Bohn, Brian Hall

Chapter in NBER book The Financing of Catastrophe Risk (1999), Kenneth A. Froot, editor (p. 363 - 390)
Published in January 1999 by University of Chicago Press
© 1999 by the National Bureau of Economic Research

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This chapter first appeared as NBER working paper w5911, The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers, James G. Bohn, Brian J. Hall
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