NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default

Pablo D'Erasmo, Enrique G. Mendoza


This chapter is a preliminary draft unless otherwise noted. It may not have been subjected to the formal review process of the NBER. This page will be updated as the chapter is revised.

Chapter in forthcoming NBER book Sovereign Debt and Financial Crisis, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Carmen Reinhart, and Kenneth Rogoff, organizers
Conference held October 18-19, 2013
Forthcoming from Wiley, Journal of the European Economic Association

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This chapter first appeared as NBER working paper w19477, Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default, Pablo D'Erasmo, Enrique G. Mendoza
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