NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Synergies between Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy: Implications for the Design of Bank Regulatory Structure

Joe Peek, Eric S. Rosengren, Geoffrey M. B. Tootell

Chapter in NBER book Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't (2001), Frederic S. Mishkin, editor (p. 273 - 300)
Conference held January 13-15, 2000
Published in January 2001 by University of Chicago Press
© 2001 by the National Bureau of Economic Research

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