NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms

Randall S. Kroszner, Philip E. Strahan

Chapter in NBER book Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't (2001), Frederic S. Mishkin, editor (p. 233 - 272)
Conference held January 13-15, 2000
Published in January 2001 by University of Chicago Press
© 2001 by the National Bureau of Economic Research

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This chapter first appeared as NBER working paper w7582, Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms, Randall S. Kroszner, Philip E. Strahan

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