NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-99

Charles W. Calomiris, Andrew Powell

Chapter in NBER book Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't (2001), Frederic S. Mishkin, editor (p. 147 - 196)
Conference held January 13-15, 2000
Published in January 2001 by University of Chicago Press
© 2001 by the National Bureau of Economic Research

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This chapter first appeared as NBER working paper w7715, Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-1999, Charles W. Calomiris, Andrew Powell
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