NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing?

Antonio Rangel, Richard Zeckhauser

Chapter in NBER book Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform (2001), John Y. Campbell and Martin Feldstein, editors (p. 113 - 152)
Published in January 2001 by University of Chicago Press
© 2001 by the National Bureau of Economic Research

download in pdf format
   (226 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

This chapter first appeared as NBER working paper w6949, Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing?, Antonio Rangel, Richard Zeckhauser
Users who downloaded this chapter also downloaded* these:
Rangel w7518 Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange
Bohn Social Security and Demographic Uncertainty: The Risk-Sharing Properties of Alternative Policies
McHale The Risk of Social Security Benefit-Rule Changes: Some International Evidence
Campbell and Feldstein Introduction to "Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform"
Ball and Mankiw w8270 Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us