NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing?

Antonio Rangel, Richard Zeckhauser

Chapter in NBER book Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform (2001), John Y. Campbell and Martin Feldstein, editors (p. 113 - 152)
Published in January 2001 by University of Chicago Press
© 2001 by the National Bureau of Economic Research

download in pdf format
   (226 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

This chapter first appeared as NBER working paper w6949, Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing?, Antonio Rangel, Richard Zeckhauser
Users who downloaded this chapter also downloaded* these:
Rangel w7518 Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange
McHale The Risk of Social Security Benefit-Rule Changes: Some International Evidence
Campbell and Feldstein Introduction to "Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform"
Rangel and Zeckhauser w6949 Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing?
MaCurdy and Shoven Asset Allocation and Risk Allocation: Can Social Security Improve Its Future Solvency Problem by Investing in Private Securities?
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us