The Endowment Model and Modern Portfolio Theory*

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Abstract

We analyze a long-term investor’s dynamic spending and asset allocation decisions by incorporating an illiquid alternative asset into an otherwise standard modern portfolio theory framework. The alternative asset has a lock-up period, but can be voluntarily liquidated or increased by paying a proportional cost prior to the lock-ups expiration. The investor benefits from liquidity diversification, which results from the alternative assets’ staggered maturity dates. The quantitative results of our calibrated model match the spending and asset allocation decisions of university endowment funds, if the alternative asset earns an expected risk-adjusted net-of-fees return of 2-3% (with public equity as the benchmark).

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1. Introduction

Modern portfolio theory (MPT) developed by Markowitz (1952) and Merton (1969, 1971) and widely-used asset allocation rules by institutional investors, such as the 60-40 rule, frame the asset allocation problem within the set of perfectly liquid securities. There are, however, many investable financial assets that are not liquid. The last several decades have seen a large increase in the popularity of illiquid “alternative assets,” such as hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, and illiquid natural resources. Figure 1 plots the aggregate portfolio allocations of university endowment funds over time, and shows how popular alternative assets have become, with alternative assets rising from only 7% of holdings in 1990 to 54.7% in 2015.

A portfolio philosophy based on high allocations to alternative assets was popularized, at least in part, by the success of David Swensen at the Yale University endowment fund, and is often referred to as the Endowment Model (see Swensen (2000), Takahashi and Alexander (2002), Liebowitz, Bova, and Hammond (2010), and Lerner (2015)). The endowment model recommends that sophisticated institutional investors allocate a significant fraction of their portfolio to illiquid alternative assets. Swensen (2000, pg. 87) argues that investors should focus on “relatively illiquid markets, since rewarding investments tend to reside in dark corners, not in the glare of floodlights.” By following this approach, Swensen is credited with earning more than $20 billion in excess returns over

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1MPT recommends that a mean-variance investor (or an investor with constant-relative-risk-aversion preferences over consumption and wealth) should allocate a constant fraction given by $x = \eta / (\gamma \sigma)$ to public equity, where $\gamma$ is the investor’s coefficient of relative risk aversion, $\eta$ is the Sharpe ratio and $\sigma$ is the volatility of public equity, respectively. This implies that with commonly used parameter values for the U.S. stock market, i.e., 6% equity risk premium and 20% volatility implying a 30% Sharpe ratio, investors with risk aversion $\gamma = 2.5$ should invest $60\% = 30\%/(2.5 \times 20\%)$ of total capital in public equity and the remaining 40% in bonds. This is how MPT provides a justification for the 60-40 rule.

2The endowment models also advocates careful selection of active portfolio managers, with a focus on aligning incentives and finding entrepreneurial managers. We do not consider this aspect of the endowment model in this paper.
a 20 year period (see Lerner (2015)).

The Endowment Model, however, has its limitations. As Swensen (2005) himself notes, only sophisticated investors who can identify superior active managers should include alternative assets in their portfolios, and many investors are better off completely avoiding alternatives. Further, the Endowment Model’s emphasis on illiquid assets can be costly. For example, during the financial crisis both Harvard and Stanford University Endowments were forced to incur significant costs due to their portfolios’ illiquidity.³

Figure 1: Endowment data are from the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) and Commonfund surveys of endowment funds. This figure shows the portfolio allocations for the value weighted “aggregate fund” by summing up the value of the holdings of the endowments in the sample in each year from 1990 to 2015. For the purpose of comparison, this sample includes only the endowment funds that entered the sample by 1990. The green area shows the allocations to cash and fixed income securities, the yellow area shows the allocations to public equity, and the red area shows the allocations to alternative assets (hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, private real estate, and illiquid natural resources).

³For further discussion of the effects of endowment illiquidity on Harvard University see Ang (2012) and for Stanford see http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/business/06sorkin.html.
We develop a model to analyze a long-term investor’s dynamic spending/consumption and asset allocation decisions by incorporating an illiquid investment opportunity into an otherwise standard MPT framework. We capture the illiquidity of the alternative asset as follows. First, the alternative asset has a finite target duration based on the lock-up and holding period, meaning that the alternative asset (or a fraction of it) periodically becomes fully liquid. This assumption corresponds to what Swensen (2000, pg. 161) terms “natural asset turnover,” such as the liquidation of private equity funds or cash distributions from alternative assets. Second, we assume that the alternative asset has unspanned risk that cannot be diversified away by public equity, which creates an additional diversification benefit from investing in the alternative asset. Third, the investor can choose to voluntarily liquidate a part of the alternative asset holding on dates other than maturity dates, but doing so incurs a proportional liquidation cost. This cost captures the empirically observed discounts for alternative assets in the secondary markets, for example, due to search and adverse selection costs. Fourth, for any voluntary acquisition of the alternative asset the investor pays an acquisition cost, which allows us to capture the costs of search, due diligence, legal and audit fees, etc. Fifth, we show how the model can incorporate liquidity diversification by allowing the investor to stagger the maturities of portions of the alternative asset holdings over time.

Our qualitative and quantitative results significantly differ from the standard predictions implied by MPT. In addition to deciding how much risk to take (i.e., the allocation between risky and risk-free assets), we show that liquidity considerations are also very important for the welfare of a long-term investor. That is, the liquidity ratio \( w = W/A \) between the total market value of liquid wealth \( W \) (e.g., stocks and bonds) and the value of the alternative asset \( A \) plays a critical role for the investor’s asset allocation and welfare, or equivalently her certainty equivalent wealth, which is the natural welfare measure.
We show that the optimal portfolio holding involves a range of \( w \) depending on the history of realized shocks to public equity and the alternative asset, due to the transaction costs and the alternative asset’s illiquidity. This is in sharp contrast with the single level for the optimal portfolio holding \( w^* \) when the alternative asset is fully liquid (full spanning and no transaction costs). Although the optimal \( w \) involves a range of values, we can still calculate the target portfolio holding that maximizes the investor’s long-term welfare, which we use to compare with the frictionless case. Because the alternative asset is illiquid and its risk is incompletely spanned by publicly traded equity, the investor values liquid wealth more than its face value as it buffers shocks to alternative assets, facilitates the acquisition of alternative assets, and enables the investor to rebalance the portfolio.

Quantitatively, we show that the marginal (welfare) value of liquid wealth can be significantly larger than one, especially when the investor’s liquidity ratio \( w \) is low. This is because a long-term investor with low liquid wealth as a fraction of her net worth values liquid wealth more due to portfolio balancing considerations.

We calibrate our model using parameters drawn from the literature, and compare the results with the portfolio allocations of U.S. university endowment funds. As Figure 1 shows, in 2015 the value weighted “aggregate endowment fund” allocated 54.7% of its holdings to alternative assets, 33.7% to public equity, and 11.8% to cash and fixed income. There is, however, substantial cross-sectional variation. For example, the Yale University endowment managed by Swensen for almost thirty years held 73.7% of its holdings in alternative assets,\(^4\) 18.6% in public equity, and 7.7% in cash and fixed income.

\(^4\)The 2015 Yale University Endowment annual report listed allocations of 20.5% to hedge funds, 16.2% to private equity, 16.3% to venture capital, 14.0% to real estate, and 6.7% to natural resources.
In contrast, 8.1% of endowments hold no alternative assets at all. Thus, the challenge for the model is to explain both the high allocations to illiquid assets by some endowments and also the substantial cross-sectional variation in allocations.

Our calibration results show that the empirically observed portfolio allocations can be justified with reasonable values of alpha. In our model, we define alpha relative to the benchmark of public equity, and thus the alternative asset’s “alpha” may include compensation for illiquidity, diversification benefits, managerial skill, and the value created through improved corporate governance and incentive structures.\(^5\) For review studies of the evidence that alternative asset funds generate alpha relative to a benchmark of public equity, see Metrick and Yasuda (2011) for private equity funds and Agarwal, Mullally, and Naik (2015) for hedge funds. Importantly, there is also evidence that investors’ vary in their ability to access the skill exhibited by alternative asset managers.\(^6\) Lerner, Schoar, and Wang (2008) argue that the endowment funds of more selective universities have access to superior alternative investment opportunities due to superior investment committees and their alumni networks, and state that their findings do not imply that ordinary endowments could achieve similar results to the top endowment funds.

In our calibration results, with an alpha of 3% per year our model implies an alternative asset allocation of 60.2% of the portfolio’s net worth, which is in line with the actual allocation found among the largest decile of endowment funds. With expected alphas of 1% and 2%, our model implies that alternative asset allocations of 12.7% and 34.5%, respectively, which approximately match the interquartile range of actual endow-

\(^5\)Franzoni, Nowak, and Phalippou (2012) show empirical evidence that private equity funds earn liquidity premia; Aragon (2007) and Sadka (2010) show similar findings for hedge funds. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) argue that private equity funds create value-add (i.e., alpha) by improving corporate governance and operating efficiency.

ment fund allocations. Finally, for endowments without access to alternative assets that earn alphas, our model implies that it is optimal for them to avoid alternative assets altogether. Thus, our model matches the empirically observed variation in allocations across endowment funds with reasonable variation in beliefs about alpha. Specifically, with an alpha of 2% per year the model implies a payout rate of 5.3% per year, which is close to the 5.2% average payout rate found by Brown, Dimmock, Kang, and Weisbenner (2014). Unlike asset allocations, the payout rate is much less sensitive to changes in alpha; increasing the expected alpha from 2% to 3% raises the implied payout rate by 20 basis points to 5.5%.

The calibration results show that asset allocations are very sensitive to the unspanned volatility of the alternative asset. As the unspanned volatility changes from 15% to 5%, investors reduce allocations to alternative assets from 34.5% of the entire portfolio to only 11.3%. This result suggests that both alpha and the diversification benefits provided by alternatives are important drivers of investors’ asset allocation.

Practitioners, such as Hayes, Primbs, and Chiquoine (2015), argue that different institutional investors vary in their ability to substitute spending over time. For example, defined benefit pension plans have little spending flexibility because payments to retirees are firm commitments. In contrast, family offices have high spending flexibility and university endowments have intermediate flexibility. As a simple way to model this preference heterogeneity across investors, we use non-expected utility preferences developed by Epstein and Zin (1989) to separate risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). The results show that risk aversion has a large effect on asset allocation, with higher risk aversion resulting in lower allocations to public equity and alternative assets. The EIS has large effects on the spending rate: changing the EIS from 0.5 to 1 decreases the spending rate from 5.3% to 4.0%. The EIS also affects port-
folio allocations when the alternative asset is illiquid. An investor with a high EIS is more willing to substitute consumption across periods, and so is more willing to accept portfolio illiquidity. For example, changing the EIS from 0.5 to 1 implies an increase in alternative asset holdings of 5.7 percentage points. This is in contrast to the case of full spanning, in which the EIS does not affect asset allocation.

**Related Literature.** Our paper is closely related to Sorensen, Wang, and Yang (2014), henceforth SWY, which uses a dynamic portfolio choice model to value the cost of illiquidity and management compensation (including both management fees and carried interest) in private equity. There are several major differences between SWY and our paper. First, SWY uses constant-absolute-risk-averse (CARA) utility, which rules out wealth effects, while we use constant-relative-risk-averse (CRRA) utility. Our choice of CRRA allows us to focus on the quantitative implications for the portfolio rule as a time-varying percentage allocation of net worth, while CARA utility predicts a wealth-independent dollar allocation to the alternative asset. Second, the two papers model illiquidity very differently. SWY assumes that the investor must hold the alternative asset for a fixed $T$ years without any option to exit. We allow for both costly liquidation and automatic free liquidity events at maturity for the alternative asset. Third, we allow for the investor to recurrently acquire and liquidate her alternative asset. Finally, our model quantitatively matches the Endowment Model for investors with access to sufficiently high alphas.

Ang, Papanikolaou, and Westerfield (2016), henceforth APW, develop a parsimonious and tractable model of portfolio choice with an illiquid asset. APW assume that the alternative asset cannot be traded for intervals of uncertain duration (modeled via a stochastic Poisson arrival process). In their model the asset can be fully illiquid for very long periods of time due to the long tails associated with exponential distributions. In
contrast, our model has a secondary market that allows liquidation at all times by paying a proportional transaction cost.

Bollen and Sensoy (2016) incorporate real options insight and develop a model for valuing illiquid private equity when secondary markets exist. Bollen and Sensoy (2016) assume that the investor must place their entire private equity allocation in a single fund, and they exogenously fix the allocation to the risk-free asset and the spending rate rather than allowing investors to make optimal portfolio rebalancing decisions. In contrast, our model allows for liquidity diversification as investors can stagger illiquid investments over time, and solve for optimal allocations to the risk free asset, the spending rate, and rebalancing decisions at all times.

Our model is related to the literature on portfolio choice with illiquid financial assets. Prior studies have used two main approaches to modeling illiquidity. First, papers such as Constantinides (1986), Davis and Norman (1990), Grossman and Laroque (1990), Vayanos (1998), Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004), and Buss, Uppal, and Vilkov (2015) model illiquidity due to transaction costs. In these models, the illiquid asset is always tradable but at a cost. Second, papers such as Kahl, Liu, and Longstaff (2003), Longstaff (2009), Dai, Li, Liu, and Wang (2010), De Roon, Guo, and ter Horst (2010), and Ang, Papaniakoou, and Westerfield (2016) model illiquidity from trading restrictions in which the asset is freely tradable at certain points in time but no trade is permitted at other times. Our model combines the features of both types of models; the alternative asset becomes fully liquid at maturity (e.g., when a private equity fund partnership is dissolved) but can be liquidated prior to maturity by paying a proportional cost (e.g., selling a private equity fund at a discount on the secondary market). Our model also incorporates non-expected utility/recursive preferences developed by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Duffie and Epstein (1992) which allow us to separate how risk aversion and the EIS interact
with portfolio illiquidity.

Our paper also contributes to the literature on university endowment funds. Merton (1992), Gilbert and Hrdlicka (2015), and Cejnek, Franz, and Stoughton (2017) model the spending and portfolio choice decisions of university endowment funds. These papers consider only fully liquid securities, while our paper analyzes the impact of illiquid alternative assets. Lerner, Schoar, and Wang (2008), Brown, Garlappi, and Tiu (2010), Barber and Wang (2013), and Ang, Ayala, and Goetzmann (2014) show there is a positive relation between allocations to alternative assets and return performance. Dimmock (2012) shows that universities with higher non-tradable income hold safer and more liquid endowment fund portfolios. Brown, Dimmock, Kang, and Weisbenner (2014) show that endowment fund losses have significant effects on university operations including personnel cuts.

2. Model

We develop a model to analyze a long-term investor’s dynamic consumption and asset allocation decisions by incorporating an illiquid investment opportunity into the otherwise standard modern portfolio theory framework developed by Merton (1969, 1971). We interpret the illiquid investment opportunity in our model as the representative portfolio of alternative assets including private equity, hedge funds, private real estate, infrastructure, and other illiquid assets. For ease of comparison with Merton’s modern portfolio theory, we also develop our model in continuous time. Next, we summarize the standard investment opportunities in liquid assets and then introduce the alternative asset.

Liquid Investment Opportunities: Public Equity and Bonds. The risk-free bond pays interest at a constant (annualized) risk-free rate \( r \). Public equity can be
interpreted as the market portfolio of publicly traded securities, and its cum-dividend
market value, \( S_t \), follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM):

\[
\frac{dS_t}{S_t} = \mu_S dt + \sigma_S dB_t^S,
\]

where \( B_t^S \) is a standard Brownian motion, and \( \mu_S \) and \( \sigma_S \) are the constant drift and
volatility parameters. The Sharpe ratio for public equity is thus:

\[
\eta_S = \frac{\mu_S - r}{\sigma_S}.
\]

The liquid investment opportunity set in our model is, by construction, the same as in
Merton (1971). Next, we introduce the alternative asset, which is the investor’s third
investment opportunity and the key building block in our model.

2.1. The Alternative Asset

Adding the alternative asset expands the investment opportunity set and thus makes the
investor better off. Additionally, provided the alternative asset is not perfectly correlated
with public equity, it provides diversification benefits. Unlike public equity, however,
alternative assets are generally illiquid and involve some form of lock-up. For example,
investments in private equity typically have a life span of 10 years with extension options,
and hedge funds often have lock-up periods and gate provisions.

A key feature of alternative assets is that their illiquidity is not constant over time.
For example, private equity funds are highly illiquid for much of their lives but eventually
mature and return liquid capital to their investors. We model these liquidity events as
follows. Let \( \{A_t; t \geq 0\} \) denote the alternative asset’s fundamental value process with a
given initial stock \( A_0 \). The fundamental value refers to the fully realizable value of the
asset if it is held to maturity. However, with illiquidity or other financial imperfections,
at any time \( t \) prior to maturity the asset’s fundamental value is different from its market
value. To capture the target finite duration of the lock-up and holding period, we assume every \( mT \) years, where \( m \) is an integer, a \( \delta_T \) fraction of the stock of illiquid alternative asset \( A_{mT} \) automatically becomes liquid at no cost. That is, in the absence of any active acquisition or divestment of the illiquid asset at \( mT \), we have \( A_{mT} = (1 - \delta_T)A_{mT-} \). Naturally, the investor’s liquid asset value at time \( mT \) increases by \( \delta_T A_{mT-} \).

**The Fundamental Value Process** \( A \). We assume that the fundamental value \( A \), in the absence of a scheduled automatic liquidity event (at time \( mT \)) or any interim acquisition or divestment, evolves via the following GBM:

\[
\frac{dA_t}{A_{t-}} = \mu_A dt + \sigma_A dB_t^A - \delta_A dt,
\]

where \( B_t^A \) is a standard Brownian motion, \( \mu_A \) is the cum-payout expected return (net of fees), \( \sigma_A \) is the constant volatility of returns, and \( \delta_A \) is the alternative asset’s payout rate. That is, the alternative asset pays dividends at the rate of \( \delta_A A_t \) with an implied dividend yield of \( \delta_A \). Intuitively, \( \delta_A \) can be interpreted as measuring regular cash disbursements, or alternatively, as a continuous time approximation of the annualized automatic liquidity as \( T \) becomes small. We use \( \rho \) to denote its correlation coefficient with \( B_t^S \), the shocks to public equity.

Note that we have purposefully written the drift of the value process \( A \) as \( \mu_A - \delta_A \), because the payout \( \delta_A \) will appear in the wealth accumulation process. In complete markets, the investor can frictionlessly and dynamically trade the alternative asset without restrictions or costs. Therefore, the alternative asset’s market value is equal to its fundamental value and the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, meaning that whether we explicitly model the payout rate \( \delta_A \) is irrelevant. In this ideal case, the alternative asset is conceptually no different than liquid public equity. In contrast, when the alternative
asset is illiquid and not fully spanned by public equity, we must separately keep track of
the dividend yield $\delta_A$ and expected capital gains $\mu_A - \delta_A$. That is, the cum-dividend pay-
out rate $\mu_A$ is no longer a sufficient measure of expected returns for the alternative asset
as its dividend and expected capital gains influence the investor’s portfolio optimization
problem differently. Next, we introduce how the investor can actively change her illiquid
alternative asset holdings.

**Interim Acquisition and Liquidation of the Alternative Asset Holding.** At any
time, the investor can choose to change her alternative asset holdings through acquisitions
or liquidations. Let $dL_t$ denote the amount of the alternative asset that the investor
liquidates at any time $t > 0$, and let $dX_t$ denote the amount of the alternative asset that
the investor purchases at time $t$. Then, we can incorporate the investor’s acquisition and
liquidation options into the alternative asset’s fundamental value process as follows:

$$
dA_t = (\mu_A - \delta_A)A_t dt + \sigma_A A_t d\mathbb{B}_t^A - dL_t + dX_t - \delta_T A_t \mathbb{I}_{t=mT-}.
$$

where $\mathbb{I}_{\cdot}$ is the indicator function. The first two terms correspond to the standard
drift and volatility terms, the third and fourth terms give the acquisition and liquidation
amounts, and the last term captures the lumpy payout to the investor at the scheduled
liquidity event dates $t = mT$ where $m = 0, 1 \cdots$.

Although the acquisition and liquidation costs for the alternative asset do not appear
in (4), they will appear in the liquid wealth accumulation process. We assume that the
cost of voluntary liquidation is proportional. That is, by liquidating an amount $dL_t > 0$,
the investor realizes only $(1 - \theta_L)dL_t$ in net, where the remaining amount $\theta_L dL_t$ is the
liquidation cost. Similarly, if the investor acquires an amount $dX_t > 0$, the transaction
cost $\theta_X dX_t$ is paid out of the liquid asset holding to the third party. Naturally, $0 \leq \theta_L \leq 1$
and $\theta_X \geq 0$. Higher values of $\theta_L$ or $\theta_X$ indicate the alternative asset is more illiquid.
Intuitively, $\theta_L$ can be interpreted as the illiquidity discount on secondary market sales of alternative assets (e.g., see Kleymenova, Tamor, and Vasvari (2012), Bollen and Sensoy (2016), and Nadauld, Sensoy, Vorkink, and Weisbach (2017)). Such discounts can arise to compensate buyers for search costs, asymmetric information risks, or due to market power when there are few buyers. The parameter $\theta_X$ can be interpreted as the transaction costs of purchasing alternative assets, such as search costs, legal fees, placement agent fees, consultant fees, etc. The costs of interim liquidation ($\theta_L$) and of purchases ($\theta_X$) can be asymmetric as voluntary liquidation is generally more costly, particularly when financing conditions are tough with few buyers and many sellers such as during the recent financial crisis. Before we analyze the effect of illiquidity, we next construct measures to quantify the risk and return of the alternative asset.

**Alpha, Beta, and Epsilon (Unspanned Volatility).** Suppose that the “instantaneous return” for the alternative asset, $dA_t/A_{t-}$, is perfectly measurable. We can then regress $dA_t/A_{t-}$ on $dS_t/S_t$, and obtain the alternative asset’s beta with respect to public equity, following the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM) formula:

$$\beta_A = \frac{\rho \sigma_A}{\sigma_S}. \quad (5)$$

However, in reality, because investors cannot dynamically rebalance their holdings in the illiquid asset without incurring transaction costs, investors will demand an additional risk premium in addition to the standard risk premium implied by the CAPM.

We decompose the total volatility of the alternative asset, $\sigma_A$, into two orthogonal components: the part spanned by the public equity, $\rho \sigma_A$, and the remaining unspanned
volatility, $\epsilon$, which is given by:

$$
\epsilon = \sqrt{\sigma_A^2 - \rho^2 \sigma_S^2} = \sqrt{\sigma_A^2 - \beta_A^2 \sigma_S^2}.
$$

(6)

This volatility, $\epsilon$, introduces an additional risk into the investor’s overall portfolio, as markets are incomplete and adjusting the alternative asset holding is costly. We will show that the spanned and unspanned volatilities play distinct roles in the investor’s dynamic asset allocation.

Anticipating our subsequent risk-return tradeoff analysis in the context of dynamic portfolio construction, we next introduce $\alpha$ implied by the CAPM, where public equity is used as the aggregate market portfolio. That is, we define $\alpha$ as follows:

$$
\alpha = \mu_A - (r + \beta_A (\mu_S - r)),
$$

(7)

where $\beta_A$ is the alternative asset’s beta given by (5). In frictionless capital markets where investors can continuously rebalance their portfolio without incurring any illiquidity discounts or transaction costs, $\alpha$ measures the risk-adjusted excess return offered by this risky asset after benchmarking against the public equity index. However, importantly, in our framework with illiquid assets, $\alpha$ also includes the part of the excess return that compensates investors for bearing an illiquidity premium (or for bearing any other systematic risk that is unspanned by public equity).

2.2. The Optimization Problem

Liquid Wealth and Net Worth. We use $W$ to denote the investor’s liquid wealth and $\Pi$ to denote the amount allocated to public equity. The remaining liquid wealth,

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7Although $\epsilon$ is unspanned by public equity, this does not necessarily imply that $\epsilon$ is purely idiosyncratic risk. We take no stand on whether public equity is the market portfolio in the sense of Roll (1977). Thus, $\epsilon$ may include systematic risks that are potentially compensated, but which are not correlated with the market portfolio.
$W - \Pi$, is allocated to the risk-free bond. Thus, liquid wealth evolves according to:

$$dW_t = (rW_t + \delta_A A_t - C_t) dt + \Pi_t (\mu S - r) dt + \sigma_S dB_t^S$$

$$+ (1 - \theta_L) dL_t - (1 + \theta_X) dX_t + \delta_T A_t \mathbb{1}_{t=mT},$$

where the first two terms in (8) are the standard ones in Merton’s consumption/portfolio-choice problem. The third and fourth terms describe the effect on liquid wealth $W$ due to the investor's interim liquidation and purchase of the alternative asset. Recall that $\theta_L$ and $\theta_X$ capture the proportional cost of interim liquidations and purchases of the alternative asset, respectively. Finally, the last term captures the lumpy payout to the investor at the automatic liquidity event dates $t = mT$.

In general, $W$ and $A$ are not perfect substitutes and the investor values them differently. Hence, simply adding them up generally does not make much economic sense. Having expressed our concerns, we still define the investor’s net worth as the sum of the two sources of wealth, as conventionally done purely as an accounting measure:

$$N_t \equiv W_t + A_t.$$  

It is convenient to use net worth $N$ when demonstrating our model’s solutions and linking to the empirical literature. We will show when net worth makes economic sense and when it does not. Finally, we close our model by introducing the investor’s preferences and defining the value functions.

**Preferences and Value Functions.** The investor’s preferences allow for separation of risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), and feature both constant relative risk aversion and constant EIS (Epstein and Zin, 1989; Weil, 1990). We use the continuous-time formulation of this non-expected utility, introduced by Duffie
and Epstein (1992). That is, the investor has a recursive preference defined as follows

\[
V_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^\infty f(C_s, V_s) ds \right], \tag{10}
\]

where \( f(C, V) \) is known as the normalized aggregator for consumption \( C \) and the investor’s utility \( V \). Duffie and Epstein (1992) show that \( f(C, V) \) for Epstein-Zin non-expected homothetic recursive utility is given by

\[
f(C, V) = \frac{\zeta - \psi^{-1}}{1 - \psi^{-1}} \frac{C^{1-\psi^{-1}} - ((1 - \gamma)V)^\chi}{((1 - \gamma)V)^{\chi-1}}, \tag{11}
\]

where

\[
\chi = \frac{1 - \psi^{-1}}{1 - \gamma}. \tag{12}
\]

The parameter \( \psi > 0 \) measures the EIS, and the parameter \( \gamma > 0 \) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The parameter \( \zeta > 0 \) is the investor’s subjective discount rate.

The widely used time-additive separable constant-relative-risk-averse (CRRA) utility is a special case of the Duffie-Epstein-Zin-Weil recursive utility specification, where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to the inverse of the EIS \( \psi \), i.e., \( \gamma = \psi^{-1} \) implying \( \chi = 1 \). For this special case, we have \( f(C, V) = U(C) - \zeta V \), where \( U(C) \) is the expected CRRA utility with \( \gamma = \psi^{-1} \) and \( U(C) = \zeta C^{1-\gamma}/(1 - \gamma) \). Note that for CRRA utility, \( f(C, V) \) is additively separable.\(^8\) In general, with \( \gamma \neq 1/\psi \), we can separately study the effects of risk aversion and the EIS.

This separation is important as it allows us to capture important preference heterogeneity among different types of investors. For example, Hayes, Primbs, and Chiquoine (2015) argue that defined benefit pension plans have little spending flexibility, because payments to retirees are firm commitments that must be honored. In contrast, family

\[^8\text{By integrating Eq. (10) forward for CRRA utility, we obtain } V = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^\infty e^{-\zeta(s-t)} U(C_s) ds \right].\]
offices have high spending flexibility and university endowments have intermediate flexibility. A simple way to model this variation across investors is through the choice of EIS (i.e., assigning a low EIS to pension funds and a high EIS to family offices).

The investor has three state variables: liquid wealth \( W_t \), the alternative asset’s value \( A_t \), and calendar time \( t \). Let \( V(W_t, A_t, t) \) denote the corresponding value function. The investor chooses consumption \( C \), public equity investment \( \Pi \), and the alternative asset’s cumulative liquidation \( L \) and cumulative acquisition \( X \) to maximize the value function \( V(W_t, A_t, t) \) by solving:

\[
V(W_t, A_t, t) = \max_{\{C, \Pi, L, X\}} \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ \int_{t}^{\infty} f(C_s, V(W_s, A_s, s))ds \right].
\]  

(13)

Naturally, at each automatic liquidity event date \( mT \), if \( W_{mT} = W_{(m-1)T} = W \), and \( A_{mT} = A_{(m-1)T} = A \), we must have

\[
V(W, A, mT) = V(W, A, (m - 1)T).
\]  

(14)

Hence, it is sufficient for us to characterize our model over \((0, T]\), as the solution is stationary every \( T \) years.

3. Solution

Dynamic Programming and First-order Conditions (FOCs). Fix time \( t \) within the time interval \(((m - 1)T, mT)\), where \( m \) is a positive integer. Using the standard dynamic programming, we have the following standard HJB equation for the investor’s value function \( V(W, A, t) \) in this region:

\[
0 = \max_{C, \Pi} f(C, V) + (rW + \delta_A A + (\mu_S - r)\Pi - C)V_W + \frac{(\Pi \sigma_S)^2}{2} V_{WW} \\
+ \left[ V_t + (\mu_A - \delta_A)AV_A + \frac{\sigma_A^2 A^2}{2} V_{AA} + \rho \Pi A \sigma_S \sigma_A V_{WA} \right].
\]  

(15)
The left side of (15) is the flow value of the investor’s value function. The first three terms on the right side of (15) capture the standard effects of consumption and asset allocation (both drift and volatility effects) on the investor’s value function as in Merton (1971). The investor’s opportunity to invest in the illiquid alternative asset generates three additional effects on asset allocation: 1) the effect of target holding horizon $T$ captured by $V_t$; 2) the risk-return and diversification effects of changes in the value of the alternative asset $A$; and 3) the additional hedging benefits due to the correlation between public equity and the alternative asset. The investor optimally equates the two sides of (15) in the interior region where there is no interim liquidation and acquisition.

The optimal consumption $C$ is characterized by the following standard FOC:

$$f_C(C, V) = V_W(W, A, t),$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)$$

which equates the marginal utility of consumption with the marginal value of wealth $V_W$. The optimal investment in public equity is given by:

$$\Pi = -\eta_S \frac{V_W}{\sigma_W} - \rho \frac{\sigma_A}{\sigma_W} AV_{WA},$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)$$

The first term gives the classical Merton’s mean-variance demand and the second term captures the investor’s hedging demand with respect to the illiquid alternative asset.

**Certainty equivalent wealth** $P(W, A, t)$. We express the investor’s value function $V(W, A, t)$ during the time period $t \in ((m - 1)T, mT)$ as:

$$V(W, A, t) = \frac{(b_1 P(W, A, t))^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma},$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)$$

where $b_1$ is a constant given by:

$$b_1 = \frac{\psi^{\phi_1^{1-\psi}}}{\phi_1^{1-\psi}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)$$
and $\phi_1$ is the constant given by

$$\phi_1 = \zeta + (1 - \psi) \left( r - \zeta + \frac{\eta_2^2}{2\gamma} \right). \quad (20)$$

We are then able to interpret $P(W, A, t)$ as the investors’ certainty equivalent wealth, which is the minimal amount of total wealth required for the investor to permanently give up the opportunity to invest in the alternative asset. That is, in the interim period where $(m - 1)T < t < mT$,

$$V(W, A, t) = J(P(W, A, t)), \quad (21)$$

where $J(\cdot)$, the value function with only liquid public equity and bonds as investable assets, is given by

$$J(W) = \frac{(b_1W)^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma}. \quad (22)$$

and $b_1$ is given in (19).

**Homogeneity Property.** In our model, the certainty equivalent wealth $P(W, A, t)$ has the homogeneity property in $W$ and $A$, and hence it is convenient to work with the liquidity ratio $w_t = W_t/A_t$ and the scaled certainty equivalent wealth function $p(w_t, t)$ defined as follows:

$$P(W_t, A_t, t) = p(w_t, t) \cdot A_t. \quad (23)$$

This homogeneity property is due to the CRRA utility and the value processes for public equity and the alternative asset. Importantly, this homogeneity property allows us to conveniently interpret the optimal portfolio rule and target asset allocation in the tradition of Merton (1971).

**Endogenous Effective Risk Aversion $\gamma_i$.** To better interpret our solution it is helpful to introduce the following measure of endogenous relative risk aversion for the investor,
denoted by $\gamma_i(w, t)$ and defined as follows:

$$
\gamma_i(w, t) \equiv -\frac{V_{Wt}}{V_W} \times P(W, A, t) = \gamma p_w(w, t) - \frac{p(w, t)p_{ww}(w, t)}{p_w(w, t)}.
$$

(24)

In (24) the first identity sign gives the definition of $\gamma_i$ and the second equality follows from the homogeneity property.

What economic insights does $\gamma_i(w, t)$ capture and what is the motivation of introducing it? First, recall the standard definition of the investor’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion is $-\frac{V_{Wt}}{V_W}$. To convert this to a measure of relative risk aversion, we need to multiply absolute risk aversion $-\frac{V_{Wt}}{V_W}$ with an appropriate economic measure for the investor’s total wealth. Under incomplete markets, although there is no market-based measure of the investor’s economic well being, the investor’s certainty equivalent wealth $P(W, A, t)$ is a natural measure of the investor’s welfare. This motivates our definition of $\gamma_i$ in (24). We will show that the illiquidity of alternative assets causes the investor to be effectively more risk averse, meaning $p_w(w, t) > 1$ and $p_{ww}(w, t) < 0$, so that $\gamma_i(w, t) > \gamma$. In contrast, if the alternative asset is publicly traded (and markets are complete), $\gamma_i(w, t) = \gamma$ as $p_w(w, t) = 1$ and $p_{ww}(w, t) = 0$.

**Optimal Policy Rules.** Again, by using the homogeneity property, we may express the scaled consumption rule $c(w, t) = C(W_t, A_t, t)/A_t$ as follows:

$$
c(w, t) = \phi_1 p(w, t) p_w(w, t)^{-\psi}.
$$

(25)

Because illiquidity makes markets incomplete, the investor’s optimal consumption policy is no longer linear and depends on both the certainty equivalent wealth $p(w, t)$ and also the marginal certainty equivalent value of liquid wealth $p_w(w, t)$.

\footnote{See Wang, Wang, and Yang (2012) and Bolton, Wang and Yang (2018) for similar definitions involving endogenous risk aversion but for very different economic applications.}
The allocation to public equity is \( \Pi_t = \pi(w_t, t)A_t \) where \( \pi(w, t) \) is given by
\[
\pi(w, t) = \frac{\eta S}{\sigma_S \gamma_i(w, t)} - \frac{\rho \sigma_A}{\sigma_S} \left( \gamma p(w, t) - \gamma_i(w, t) - w \right),
\]
where \( \gamma_i(\cdot) \) is the investor’s effective risk aversion given by (24). Intuitively, the first term in (26) reflects the mean-variance demand for the market portfolio, which differs from the standard Merton model in two ways: 1) risk aversion \( \gamma \) is replaced by the effective risk aversion \( \gamma_i(w, t) \) and 2) net worth is replaced by certainty equivalent wealth \( p(w, t) \).

The second term in (26) captures the dynamic hedging demand, which also depends on \( \gamma_i(w, t) \) and \( p(w, t) \).

Finally, we turn to the PDE for \( p(w, t) \).

**PDE for \( p(w, t) \).** Substituting the value function (18) and the policy rules for \( c \) and \( \pi \) into the HJB equation (15) and using the homogeneity property and the definition of the investor’s effective risk aversion, \( \gamma_i \), given by (24), we obtain the following PDE for \( p(w, t) \) at time \( t \), for the liquidity ratio \( w_t \) in the interior region, and when \( (m-1)T < t < mT \):
\[
0 = \left( \phi_1 \left( \frac{p(w, t)}{w} \right)^{1-\psi} - \psi \xi \right) - \frac{\sigma_A^2}{2} p(w, t) + p_t(w, t) + \frac{\epsilon^2 w^2}{2} p_{ww}(w, t)
\]
\[
+ \left( \delta_A - \alpha + \gamma \epsilon^2 \right) \left( \frac{w p_{w}(w, t) - \gamma \epsilon^2 w^2 \left( p_{w}(w, t) \right)^2}{2 p(w, t)} + \frac{(\eta S - \gamma \rho \sigma_A)^2 p_{w}(w, t) p(w, t) \gamma_i}{2 \gamma_i} \right).
\]

Because of incomplete spanning (e.g., \( \epsilon \neq 0 \)), unlike Black-Scholes, (27) is a nonlinear PDE, and moreover, \( p_{w}(w, t) > 1 \), as we will show. The numerical solution for \( p(w, t) \) involves the standard procedure. Next, we analyze how the investor actively rebalances the allocation to the illiquid alternative asset.

**Rebalancing the Illiquid Alternative Asset during the Interim Period.** Although under normal circumstances the investor plans to hold the alternative asset until
the target date \( mT \) when an automatic liquidity event occurs, under certain circumstances the investor may find it optimal to actively rebalance when \( t \neq mT \).

Consider an investor whose pre-liquidation holdings in public equity and the alternative asset at time \( t \) are \((W_t, A_t)\). Let \( \Delta > 0 \) denote the unit of the alternative asset that the investor is considering to voluntarily liquidate. As the cost of liquidating the alternative asset prematurely is \( \theta_L \) for each unit of the asset, the investor’s post-liquidation position, is then \((W'_t, A'_t)\), where \( W'_t = W_t + (1 - \theta_L)\Delta \) and \( A'_t = A_t - \Delta \). We use the prime superscript to denote the post-liquidation position.

One necessary condition when the investor liquidates a portion of the alternative asset is that the value function is continuous, which implies \( P(W'_t, A'_t, t) = P(W_t, A_t, t) \), implicitly defining the lower liquidation boundary \( W_t \) as a function of \( A_t \) at time \( t \). Intuitively, when the illiquid alternative asset position is too high compared with the liquid wealth \( W_t \) at time \( t \), the investor may choose to voluntarily reduce the illiquid asset holding. In the differential form and after using the homogeneity property to simplify, we show in Appendix A that the following holds:

\[
p(w_t, t) = (1 - \theta_L + w_t) p_w(w_t, t),
\]

which defines \( w_t \), the lower liquidation boundary for the liquidity ratio \( w_t \) at time \( t \). As \( p \geq 0 \) and \( p_w \geq 0 \), it is immediate to see that \( w_t \geq -(1 - \theta_L) \). That is, the investor cannot borrow more than \((1 - \theta_L)\) fraction of the alternative asset’s fundamental value. This ensures that the investor’s liability can be fully repaid with probability one by liquidating the alternative asset. Note that the investor’s debt capacity is endogenously determined by the liquidation value of the alternative asset holdings. Although the investor can borrow, in our numerical exercise, as in reality, the investor rarely does borrow.

Following essentially the same procedure, we obtain the following condition for the
interim acquisition of alternative assets:

\[ p(w_t, t) = (1 + \theta X + w_t) p_w(w_t, t), \]

which defines \( w_t \), the endogenous acquisition boundary for \( w_t \) at time \( t \).

Next, we provide the conditions that describe the investor’s *optimal* liquidation and acquisition decisions. By differentiating (28) with respect to \( w_t \) and (29) with respect to \( w_t \), we obtain the following boundary conditions:

\[ p_{ww} (w_t, t) = 0, \]

\[ p_{ww} (w_t, t) = 0, \]

which are often referred to as the “super contact” conditions as in Dumas (1991). The intuition for the super-contact condition is as follows. For an optimally chosen liquidation boundary \( w_t \) or acquisition boundary \( w_t \), the investor’s marginal (certainty equivalent) value of allocating a unit of wealth at the margin to either public equity or the alternative asset must be equal.

**Value and Decisions at** \( t = mT \). The homogeneity property allows us to express the value-matching condition (14) in terms of \( p(w, t) \) at \( t = mT \):

\[ p(w, mT) = p(w, (m - 1)T). \]

As acquisition and voluntary liquidation are costly, we have an inaction region at all time including \( t = mT \).

Additionally, at \( t = mT \), a fraction \( \delta T \) of the alternative asset automatically becomes fully liquid meaning that the alternative asset holding \( A \) changes discretely from \( A_t \) to \( A_t - \delta T A_t \) and the liquid wealth \( W \) correspondingly changes from \( W_t \) to \( W_t + \delta T A_t \) as \( t \to mT \) in the absence of any acquisition or voluntary liquidation.
For expositional simplicity, we denote the corresponding levels of liquid wealth and the alternative asset:

\[
\hat{W}_{mT} = \lim_{t \to mT} (W_t + \delta_T A_t) \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{A}_{mT} = \lim_{t \to mT} (A_t - \delta_T A_t).
\]

Let \( \hat{w}_{mT} \) denote the corresponding liquidity ratio at \( mT \):

\[
\hat{w}_{mT} \equiv \frac{\hat{W}_{mT}}{\hat{A}_{mT}} = \lim_{t \to mT} \frac{w_t + \delta_T}{1 - \delta_T}.
\] (33)

There are two cases to consider at \( t = mT \): (i.) \( \hat{w}_{mT} \leq \overline{w}_{mT} \) and (ii.) \( \hat{w}_{mT} > \overline{w}_{mT} \). Case (i.) means that, even after the automatic liquidity event, the liquid asset holding remains below the threshold \( \overline{w}_{mT} \) at which the investor rebalances by voluntarily acquiring more of the illiquid asset. In contrast, Case (ii.) means that the automatic liquidity event causes the investor’s portfolio to be overly exposed to the liquid asset. In this latter case, the investor needs to acquire additional illiquid alternative asset to rebalance the overall portfolio. Finally, as the automatic liquidity event always increases the liquid asset holding relative to the illiquid asset holding, it thus will never cause \( \hat{w}_{mT} \) to fall below \( \overline{w}_{mT} \) and hence we need only consider the two cases that may be triggered by the automatic liquidity event with a scheduled lump-sum payment \( \delta_T A_{mT} \).

- Case (i): \( \hat{w}_{mT} \leq \overline{w}_{mT} \). The continuity of the value function and the homogeneity property imply \( \lim_{t \to mT} p(w, t) A_t = p(\hat{w}_{mT}, mT) \hat{A}_{mT} \). Simplifying this, we obtain:

\[
\lim_{t \to mT} p(w, t) = p(\hat{w}_{mT}, t)(1 - \delta_T) = \lim_{t \to mT} p \left( \frac{w_t + \delta_T}{1 - \delta_T}, mT \right) (1 - \delta_T). \] (34)

- Case (ii): \( \hat{w}_{mT} > \overline{w}_{mT} \). The investor optimally purchases \( \Delta \) units of the alternative asset such that \( \hat{W}_{mT} - (1 + \theta_X)\Delta = \overline{W}_{mT} \). By purchasing \( \Delta \) units, the investor pulls the liquidity ratio \( w \) back to the upper bound of the target asset allocation range \( (\overline{w}_{mT}, \underline{w}_{mT}) \), so that the following identity,

\[
\overline{w}_{mT} = \frac{\hat{W}_{mT} - (1 + \theta_X)\Delta}{\hat{A}_{mT} + \Delta} = \lim_{t \to mT} \frac{W_t + \delta_T A_t - (1 + \theta_X)\Delta}{A_t - \delta_T A_t + \Delta},
\] (35)
holds. Solving the above gives the following expression for the number of units for the alternative asset, $\Delta$, to be purchased at time $mT$:

$$
\Delta = \lim_{t \to mT} \frac{w_t + \delta_T - \bar{w}_mT(1 - \delta_T)}{1 + \theta_X + \bar{w}_mT} A_t
$$

(36)

Again, the continuity of the value function and homogeneity property imply

$$
\lim_{t \to mT} p(w, t) = p(\bar{w}_mT, mT) \left(1 - \delta_T + \frac{w_{mT-} + \delta_T - \bar{w}_mT(1 - \delta_T)}{1 + \theta_X + \bar{w}_mT}\right).
$$

(37)

Next, we summarize the main results of our model.

**Proposition 1** The scaled certainty equivalent wealth $p(w, t)$ in the interim period when $(m - 1)T < t \leq mT$ solves the PDE (27) subject to the boundary conditions (28), (29), (30), (31), and (32). Additionally, $p(w_{mT-}, mT-)$ satisfies (34), if $\hat{w}_{mT} < \bar{w}_mT$ where $\hat{w}_{mT}$ is given by (33), and satisfies (37) if $\hat{w}_{mT} \geq \bar{w}_mT$.

4. **Data and Calibration**

4.1. **Data and Summary Statistics**

The data on university endowment fund sizes, asset allocations, and returns come from annual surveys conducted by the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) and Commonfund, and referred to as the NACUBO-Commonfund Endowment Survey (NCES). We focus on the cross-section of 774 university endowment funds10 as of the end of the 2014-2015 academic year.

**Asset allocation.** The NCES provides annual snapshots of endowment funds’ portfolio allocations. To link the NCES data to the model, we aggregate endowment allocations

10If there are multiple distinct endowment funds associated with a single university, we aggregate them to obtain a single fund per university.
in the NCES data into the three asset classes featured in our model: (1) the risk-free asset, which aggregates cash and fixed income, (2) public equity, which aggregates public equity and REITs,\textsuperscript{11} and (3) the alternative asset, which aggregates hedge funds (including managed futures), private equity, venture capital, private real estate, and illiquid natural resources. In the summary statistics, and for generating some of the calibration parameters, we use the disaggregated sub-asset classes (e.g., hedge funds, etc.).

\textsuperscript{11}We group together public equity and REITs because they have similar levels of risk and of liquidity. Further, the NCES data set includes REITs in the public equity category.
Table 1: Summary of Endowment Fund Asset Allocation

This table summarizes endowment fund portfolios as of the end of the 2014-2015 academic year for 774 endowments. The last column reports averages that are value weighted by endowment fund size. Panel A shows summary statistics for endowment fund size (reported in millions of dollars), asset class allocations and spending rates (reported in percentages), and the number of alternative asset management firms with which the endowment invests. Cash & Fixed Income includes cash, cash equivalents, and fixed income securities (except for distressed securities). Public Equity includes domestic and foreign equity as well as REITs. Alternative Allocations includes hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, private real estate, and illiquid natural resources. Panel B reports summary statistics for the more detailed sub-asset classes. Hedge Funds includes managed futures. Real Estate reports holdings of private real estate. Natural Resources includes illiquid natural resources, such as timberland and oil & gas partnerships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>75%</th>
<th>95%</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>VW Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endowment Size ($M)</strong></td>
<td>677</td>
<td>2,483</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>2,332</td>
<td>36,449</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cash &amp; Fixed Income</strong></td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Equity</strong></td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative Allocations</strong></td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spending Rate</strong></td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. Alternative Funds</strong></td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>56.0</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>75%</th>
<th>95%</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>VW Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cash &amp; Equivalents</strong></td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-15.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>6.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Income</strong></td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Equity</strong></td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hedge Funds</strong></td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Private Equity</strong></td>
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<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venture Capital</strong></td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private Real Estate</strong></td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Resources</strong></td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 shows summary statistics as of the end of the 2014-2015 academic year for the sample of endowment funds. The summary statistics are equal weighted, except for the last column which reports value weighted averages. Panel A shows the average Endowment Size is $677 million, but this is highly skewed and the median is $114 million. On an equal weighted basis, the largest asset class is Public Equity, with an average allocation of 50.7% and a value weighted average of 35.6%, implying that percentage allocations to public equity decrease with fund size. On a value weighted basis, Alternative Allocations is the largest asset class at 51.7%, compared with 35.6% for public equity and 12.7% for cash and fixed income. Comparing the equal and value weighted averages shows that allocations to alternative assets are considerably higher for larger endowments. Panel A also shows that the average endowment spends 4.2% of its assets in 2015. The final row shows that the average endowment invests with nearly 17 distinct alternative asset managers, but the median invests with only four. There is considerable dispersion, and larger endowments invest with significantly more distinct managers.

Panel B of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the more detailed sub-asset categories. Within Alternative Allocations, the largest sub-asset class is hedge funds with an average allocation of 16.7%. For all of the sub-asset classes, the value weighted averages are considerably larger than the equal weighted, particularly for the least liquid categories: private equity, venture capital, private real estate, and illiquid natural resources.

As seen in Figure 1, Alternative Allocations have increased over time.\footnote{Note that to avoid conflating time-series changes and changes in the composition of endowments included in the NCES, Figure 1 uses only data for endowment funds that were in the sample in 1990.} The portfolio allocations for 2015 reported in Table 1 are substantially higher than the allocations reported in studies using earlier waves of the NCES data, such as Brown, Garlappi, and Tiu (2010) or Dimmock (2012).
Table 2: The Cross-Section of Endowment Fund Asset Allocation

This table summarizes the dispersion in asset allocation across the cross-section of endowment fund sizes as of the end of the 2014-2015 academic year. The columns show allocations for size-segmented groups of endowment funds. For example, the column “0-10%” shows the average portfolio allocation for the smallest decile of endowment funds. The column “45-55%” shows the average portfolio allocation for the decile of endowment funds centered around the median fund size. The final two columns show the average portfolio allocations for the largest 20 and 10 endowment funds, respectively. In all columns, the averages are value weighted by endowment fund size within the corresponding group. The target horizon variables summarized in Panel A are reported in years. Alternative Target Horizon reports the target horizon of the portion of the portfolio allocated to alternative assets. Port. Target Horizon reports the value weighted target horizon of the entire portfolio. Average No. of Alt. Funds (Median No. of Alt. Funds) is the average (median) number of different alternative asset management firms with which the endowment invests (we do not report these variable for the 10 largest endowment funds, as only three of the 10 largest funds report the number of managers).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0-10%</th>
<th>20-30%</th>
<th>45-55%</th>
<th>70-80%</th>
<th>90-100%</th>
<th>Top 20</th>
<th>Top 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panel A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment Size ($M)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>1,3409</td>
<td>18,585</td>
<td>22,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash &amp; Fixed Income</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Equity</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Allocations</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alt. Target Horizon</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port. Target Horizon</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending Rate</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average No. of Alt. Funds</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>152.2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median No. of Alt. Funds</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash &amp; Equivalents</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Income</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Equity</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedge Funds</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Equity</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venture Capital</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Real Estate</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 shows the cross-section of endowment fund asset allocation in 2015, with funds segmented by endowment size. For example, the first column shows the average allocations of endowment funds in the bottom size decile. Smaller endowments have higher allocations to cash, fixed income, and public equity; larger endowments have higher allocations to alternative assets. The differences in allocations are largest for private equity, venture capital, and natural resources, which are the least liquid categories.

**Portfolio Illiquidity and Target Horizons.** We estimate endowment fund target holding periods based on allocations to alternative assets combined with the horizons of the asset classes. For hedge funds, we assume a horizon of six months, which is approximately equal to the sum of the average redemption, advance notice, and lockup periods reported in Getmansky, Liang, Schwarz, and Wermers (2015). For private equity and venture capital, we assume a horizon of 10 years, based on the average commitment period reported in Metrick and Yasuda (2010). For private real estate and illiquid natural resources, we also assume horizons of 10 years, based on the holding periods reported in Collet, Lizieri, and Ward (2003) and Newell and Eves (2009).

Panel B of Table 2 summarizes the calculated target horizons for the cross-section of endowment funds. **Alternative Target Horizon** reports the value weighted average target horizon for the alternative assets held in the portfolio. **Portfolio Target Horizon** reports the target horizon of the entire portfolio. The portfolios of the larger endowment funds are substantially less liquid, both because they have higher allocations to alternative assets and because they allocate proportionally more of their alternative asset holdings to the least liquid categories.

Table 2 also reports the average number of alternative asset management firms with which the endowment invests, which is an important component of liquidity manage-
ment. Consider two examples. Suppose Endowment A invests its entire alternative asset allocation into a single private equity fund, with a 10 year partnership agreement. Suppose Endowment B invests its alternative asset allocation across 120 different private equity funds, each of which has a 10 year partnership agreement. Further suppose that Endowment B staggers its investments across time, so that one partnership agreement expires every month for the next 10 years. Although both endowments might have the same portfolio allocation to private equity, they have very different liquidity exposures. For the next 10 years, Endowment A can only reduce its private equity exposure through the secondary market. In contrast, Endowment B can costlessly reduce its exposure to private equity as partnership agreements expire each month. Thus, by holding multiple funds and staggering their maturity over time, the endowment can enhance the liquidity of the whole portfolio, which we refer to as liquidity diversification.

As Panel A of Table 2 shows, there is a strong positive relation between endowment size and the number of alternative asset funds. On average, endowments in the largest decile hold 86.5 alternative asset funds; endowments in the smallest decile own only a single fund. In the full sample, 8.1% of endowments do not own any alternative assets at all, and as expected, zero-holdings are far more common for smaller endowments.

4.2. Parameter Choices and Calibration

Calculating Unspanned Volatility. Calibrating the model requires the standard deviation, beta, and unspanned volatility of the representative alternative asset. To obtain these parameters, we build up from the standard deviations and correlations of the sub-asset classes comprising the representative alternative asset. For each sub-asset class $a$, we combine its $\beta_a$ and $R^2_a$ with the standard deviation of the market $\sigma_S = 20\%$ to obtain the implied standard deviation for the asset class: $\sigma_a = \sqrt{\beta_a^2 \sigma_S^2 / R^2_a}$. 
Panel A of Appendix Table A1 shows the $\beta_A$, $R^2_A$, and $\sigma_A$ for each of the alternative sub-asset classes. For hedge funds, the $\beta$ and $R^2$ are taken from Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and account for return smoothing; other studies that account for return smoothing find similar values (e.g., Asness, Krail, and Liew (2004) and Jurek and Stafford (2015)). For private equity and venture capital, the $\beta$s and $R^2$s are taken from Ewens, Jones, and Rhodes-Kropf (2013). For private real estate and illiquid natural resources, the variables are based on Pedersen, Page, and He (2014) and account for return smoothing. Panel B of Appendix Table A1 shows the pairwise correlations between the asset classes, which are calculated using index returns over the period 1994-2015.

We combine the asset allocations from Table 2 with the $\beta$s, $\sigma$s, and correlations from Appendix Table A1 to impute portfolio $\beta$s, $\sigma$s, and unspanned volatilities ($\epsilon$). Table 3 shows the imputed variables for the cross-section of endowment funds. Although large endowments substitute alternative assets for public equity and fixed income, the implied portfolio $\beta$ are remarkably similar across the size groups. The implied portfolio $\sigma$s are higher for larger endowments, because they have greater exposure to the idiosyncratic risk of alternative assets, but the implied $\epsilon$ are similar across size groups.

Parameter choices. We base several of our parameters on the endowment fund data discussed above. Specifically, we set the alternative asset $\beta_A = 0.6$ and the unspanned volatility of the alternative asset to $\epsilon = 15\%$ with the objective of closely targeting the value weighted endowment fund portfolio values reported earlier ($\beta_A = 0.61$ and $\epsilon = 13\%$). Empirical estimates for the $\beta$ of venture capital vary widely, ranging from 1.2 (Kraussl, Jegadeesh, and Pollet (2015)) to 2.73 (Driessen, Lin, and Phalippou (2012)).

The index returns used to calculate the correlations in Panel B are: Bloomberg/Barclays US Aggregate Bond Index, CRSP value weighted index, Credit Suisse/Tremont Aggregate Hedge Fund Index, Cambridge Associates U.S. Private Equity Index, Cambridge Associates U.S. Venture Capital Index, NCREIF Property Index (unsmoothed), and the S&P Global Timber and Forestry Index. The correlations with private equity, venture capital, private real estate, and illiquid natural resources use quarterly returns; the other correlations use monthly returns.
This table shows the implied $\beta$s, $\sigma$s, and unspanned volatilities of the endowment fund portfolios whose allocations are shown in Table 2. Note that $\beta_A$ is the beta of the alternative asset holdings, $\sigma_A$ is the standard deviation of alternative assets, and $\epsilon$ is the volatility of the endowment fund’s alternative asset holdings that is unspanned by public equities. *Portfolio $\beta$* and *Portfolio $\sigma$* are the overall endowment portfolio $\beta$ and standard deviation, respectively. The columns show allocations for size-segmented groups of endowments. e.g., the column “0-10%” shows the value-weighted statistics for the smallest decile of endowment funds. The last column shows summary statistics for the value weighted endowment fund portfolio.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Portfolio $\beta$</th>
<th>0-10%</th>
<th>20-30%</th>
<th>45-55%</th>
<th>70-80%</th>
<th>90-100%</th>
<th>Top 20</th>
<th>Top 10</th>
<th>VW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_A$</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_A$</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon$</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14.2%). We set the horizon of the representative alternative asset $H = 6$ years based on the Alternative Target Horizons summarized earlier.

Following the literature, we choose the following standard parameter values: the annual risk-free rate $r = 4\%$ and the investor’s coefficient of relative risk aversion $\gamma = 2$. We set the EIS to be $\psi = 0.5$, so that it corresponds to expected utility with $\gamma = 1/\psi = 2$. We also set the investor’s discount rate equal to the risk-free rate, $\zeta = r$. For public equity, we use an annual volatility of $\sigma_S = 20\%$, with the widely-used aggregate equity risk premium of $\mu_S - r = 6\%$, which implies a Sharpe ratio of $\eta_S = 0.3$.

In our model, the alpha of the illiquid alternative investment includes compensation for skill, liquidity risk, and other risks unspanned by public equities. We set $\alpha = 2\%$, which we view as conservative given the empirical findings in the literature. For example, Franzoni, Nowak, and Phalippou (2012) find that private equity earns a net-of-fees liquid-
ity risk premium of 3% annually. Aragon (2007) and Sadka (2010) find similar net-of-fees liquidity risk premia for hedge funds. Empirical studies of endowment funds also find a positive relation between performance and allocations to illiquid assets (e.g., Lerner, Schoar, and Wang (2008), Brown, Garlappi, and Tiu (2010), Barber and Wang (2013), and Ang, Ayala, and Goetzmann (2014)). Given this assumed alpha, the expected overall return on the alternative asset is
\[ \mu_A = 0.02 + 0.04 + 0.6 \times (0.10 - 0.04) = 0.096 = 9.6\% . \]

For voluntary liquidations, we assume the proportional transaction cost is \( \theta_L = 10\% \), based on empirical findings and the following back-of-the-envelope calculation: For secondary market liquidations of private equity, Kleymenova, Talmor, and Vasvari (2012) and Nadauld, Sensoy, Vorkink, and Weisbach (2017) find average discounts of 25.2% and 13.8%, respectively. For secondary market liquidations of hedge funds, Ramadorai (2012) finds an average discount of 0.9%, which rises to 7.8% during the financial crisis. Therefore, we combine the aggregate endowment fund portfolio weights with liquidation costs of 20% for PE and VC, 1% for hedge funds, and 10% for private real estate and timberland, to obtain a proportional liquidation cost of 9.3% for the representative alternative asset. For acquisitions, we assume the proportional acquisition cost is \( \theta_X = 2\% \), which is equal to the average placement agent fee reported by Rikato and Berk (2015) and Cain, McKeon, and Solomon (2016).

Calibrating the model also requires a payout parameter, which determines the amount of automatic liquidity generated for the portfolio through automatic liquidity events (e.g., liquidity from funds maturing and paying out capital to the limited partners). The payout rate depends on the number of alternative asset funds held by the investor. For example, given the target horizon of \( H = 6 \) years, an investor with a single alternative asset fund would receive a large payout once every six years. In contrast, an investor with a large number of funds would receive smaller but more frequent payouts. For any given
number of funds, Appendix E shows how it is possible to impute the payout rate using
the previously described parameter values. For our baseline calibration, we use the case
of $n \to \infty$. As shown in Appendix E, this implies a payout rate of $\delta_A = 4.0\%$. Appendix
E also considers other cases such as $n = 1$, $n = 12$, etc.

Table 4 summarizes the symbols for the key variables in the model and the parameter
values in the baseline model.
This table summarizes the symbols for the key variables in the model and baseline parameter values. For certain upper case variable names in the left column (Π, W, C, and P), we use its lower case to denote the ratio of this variable to the amount of the alternative investment, A. For completeness, the table also reports implied parameters; redundant parameters whose values are determined by other parameters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alternative asset</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Coefficient of relative risk aversion</td>
<td>γ</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market portfolio allocation</td>
<td>Π</td>
<td>Elasticity of intertemporal substitution</td>
<td>ψ</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid wealth</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Subjective discount rate</td>
<td>ζ</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total net worth</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Risk-free rate</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption (expenditure)</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Public equity expected return</td>
<td>μ_s</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainty equivalent wealth</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Volatility of market portfolio</td>
<td>σ_s</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scaled net certainty equivalent wealth</td>
<td>q</td>
<td>Beta of the alternative asset</td>
<td>β_A</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative interim alternative asset liquidations</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Alternative asset alpha</td>
<td>α</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative interim alternative asset acquisitions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Alternative asset’s expected return</td>
<td>μ_A</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value function</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Volatility of alternative asset</td>
<td>σ_A</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brownian motion for public equity return</td>
<td>B_S</td>
<td>The alternative asset’s target horizon</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brownian motion for alternative asset return</td>
<td>B_A</td>
<td>Proportional cost of liquidation</td>
<td>θ_L</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition boundary</td>
<td>w</td>
<td>Proportional cost of acquisition</td>
<td>θ_X</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidation boundary</td>
<td>w</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid wealth at $→ mT$</td>
<td>W_mT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative asset at $→ mT$</td>
<td>A_mT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Implied parameters**

- Public equity Sharpe ratio: $\eta_S = 0.30$
- Correlation between risky assets: $\rho = 0.625$
- Unspanned volatility: $\epsilon = 15\%$
- The payout rate: $\delta_A = 4.00\%$
5. Results

In this section, we use the parameter values from the preceding section to analyze our model's implications. We begin with the limiting case as \( n \to \infty \), and then explore the case of \( n = 1 \). Following this, we study the comparative statics of the model.

As a benchmark, we also provide results for the case in which the alternative asset is fully liquid. In this case, the alternative asset simply expands the investment opportunity set and the optimization problem is again Merton’s model with two publicly traded liquid risky assets. Thus, the value function for this case is clearly higher than when the alternative asset is illiquid. Indeed, the case of full spanning serves as an upper bound for the investor’s value function. See Appendix B.1 for a detailed discussion.

5.1. The case of \( n \to \infty \)

Net certainty equivalent wealth. Figure 2 plots the results for the case of \( n \to \infty \), in which \( \delta_A = 4\% \). In both panels, the \( x \)-axis displays the liquidity ratio \( w \). Panel A shows that the investor optimally sets the range of \( w \) to lie between \((w, \overline{w}) = (0.54, 2.64)\). That is, if the liquidity ratio \( w \) falls to the endogenous liquidation boundary, \( \underline{w} = 0.54 \), the investor immediately sells just enough units of the illiquid alternative asset and invests the proceeds in liquid assets to keep \( w \geq 0.54 \). If the liquidity ratio rises to the endogenous acquisition boundary, \( \overline{w} = 2.64 \), the investor acquires just enough units of the illiquid asset so that \( w \) falls back to 2.64. In sharp contrast, when the alternative asset is perfectly liquid, (i.e., the case of full spanning), the optimal liquidity ratio is a singleton rather than a line: \( w^* = 1.25 \), which one can show by rearranging (C.3): 

\[
\frac{W_t}{A_t} = \frac{N_t - A_t}{A_t} = \frac{\gamma^2}{\alpha} - 1 = 1.25.
\]

Panel A of Figure 2 plots the liquidity ratio, \( w \), on the \( x \)-axis and net certainty
Figure 2: Panels A and B plot investors’ net certainty equivalent wealth \( q(w) = p(w) - w \) and net marginal value of liquid wealth \( q'(w) \) as functions of the liquidity ratio \( w \), respectively. The input parameter values are given in Table 4. For this figure, we set \( n = \infty \) and \( \delta_A = 4\% \). The blue solid lines show results for the general case within the optimal rebalancing boundaries \( \bar{w} = 0.54 \) and \( \bar{w} = 2.64 \). The red dot shows the solution under Full Spanning, which involves a static optimal \( w^* = 1.25 \) and \( q^* = 1.20 \).
equivalent wealth

\[ q(w) = p(w) - w \]

(38)
on the y-axis. Naturally, \( q(w) \) conveys the same information as \( p(w) \) but is easier to read graphically. As Panel A shows, \( q(w) \) is increasing and concave in \( w \). Intuitively, the curve is upward sloping because the investor incurs less and less disutility from the asset’s illiquidity and unspanned volatility as the illiquid asset becomes a smaller fraction of the portfolio. Under full spanning, the net certainty equivalent wealth is higher than for the same \( w \) under the general case. The vertical difference between full spanning and the general case can be interpreted as the utility cost of illiquidity (measured in dollars per unit of contemporaneous \( A \)). For illustration, consider a simple example in which the investor has total net worth \( N_t = 225M \) with \( A_t = 100M \) invested in the alternative asset and the remaining \( W_t = 125M \) invested in liquid assets, implying \( w_t = 1.25 \). At this point, \( q(w_t) = 1.17 \) implying that, to avoid loss of utility, the investor would require \( 0.17 \times 100M = 17M \) in compensation to permanently give up the opportunity of investing in the alternative asset and invest only in the risk-free asset and public equity. Additionally, when the alternative asset is fully liquid, \( q(w) = 1.20 \) meaning that the additional value from full spanning is \( (1.20 - 1.17) \times 100M = 3M \). For this numerical example, the vast majority (85% = \( 17M/20M \)) of the alternative asset’s value-added is due to the excess return. The additional value-add due to complete spanning accounts for only 15% of \( 20M \).

Panel B plots the net marginal value of liquid wealth \( q'(w) \), which is always positive, reflecting the disutility from the alternative asset’s illiquidity and unspanned volatility. The net marginal value of \( W, P_W - 1 = q'(w_t) \) declines from 13 cents (per dollar of \( A \)) to seven cents as \( w \) increases from \( w = 0.54 \) to \( w = 2.64 \), indicating that the marginal
benefits of additional liquid wealth decrease as the fraction of the portfolio held in liquid wealth increases.

**Determining the optimal portfolio target** $\hat{w}$. Figure 3 shows the ratio of the portfolio’s certainty equivalent wealth to its book value, plotted for all values of $w$ within the endogenous rebalancing boundaries, $(\underline{w}, \overline{w}) = (0.54, 2.64)$. Although all values of $w$ within these rebalancing boundaries are possible given the transaction costs, not all values of $w$ give the investor the same utility. Hypothetically, if the investor could costlessly choose the split between $W$ and $A$ for a given $N = W + A$, he would choose $\hat{w} = 1.9$. At this point, the investor’s certainty equivalent wealth from the portfolio is 7.8% higher than the investor’s net worth. The curve is noticeably asymmetric and declines more rapidly to the left of the maximum, as the investor approaches the voluntary liquidation boundary. This is caused by the asymmetry of the rebalancing costs, with the proportional liquidation cost ($\theta_L = 10\%$) larger than the proportional acquisition cost ($\theta_X = 2\%$).

**5.2. The case of** $n = 1$

We have just analyzed the case of $n \to \infty$, in which the alternative asset continuously provides liquidity at the constant dividend yield $\delta_A$. Now, we consider the other extreme possibility of an investor with $n = 1$. In this case, the alternative asset has an automatic liquidity event once every six years, at which point the investor reinvests 78.66% of the proceeds back into the alternative asset and keeps 21.34% of the proceeds in liquid assets. See Appendix E for more details.

**Rebalancing boundaries.** Figure 4 shows the rebalancing boundaries over the period $0 < t < T$. The blue solid line shows the voluntary liquidation boundary, $\underline{w}_t$, and the red
Figure 3: This figure plots \( \frac{p(w)}{w+1} \), the ratio of the certainty equivalent wealth \( P(W, A) = p(w)A \) and net worth \( N = W + A \) on the y-axis and the liquidity ratio \( w \) on the x-axis over the support range \( (w, \bar{w}) = (0.54, 2.64) \) for the case with \( n = \infty \) and \( \delta_A = 4\% \). Other parameter values are given in Table 4. Note that \( \hat{w} = 1.9 \) and the maximand is \( \frac{p(\hat{w})}{(\hat{w}+1)} = 1.078 \), highlighted in the figure.
Figure 4: This figure plots the optimal (lower) liquidation boundary \( w_t \) and (upper) acquisition boundary \( \overline{w}_t \) over time. The input parameter values are given in Table 4. The dotted lines correspond to the case with \( n = \infty \) with continuous payouts at the rate of \( \delta_A = 4\% \). The two decreasing lines correspond to the case with \( n = 1 \) where the implied payout \( \delta_T = 21.34\% \) every six years, i.e., \( H = 6 \).

The dashed line shows the acquisition boundary \( \overline{w}_t \). As a basis of comparison, the horizontal dotted lines show results for the case with \( n \to \infty \).

Both boundaries decrease as \( t \to T \). This means that the investor is less willing to liquidate alternative assets and more willing to voluntarily acquire alternative assets as the anticipated liquidity event date \( t = mT \) approaches. This is intuitive as the investor can simply wait until the automatic liquidity event rather than incurring the liquidation cost to reach the “target” steady state. Also, anticipating the cash inflows from the automatic liquidity event, the investor rationally becomes more willing to acquire alternative assets as \( t \) gets closer to \( mT \). The decrease for the voluntary liquidation boundary \( w_t \) is
particularly pronounced, because of the liquidation cost $\theta_L = 10\%$. Indeed, the liquidation boundary $w_t$ eventually becomes negative, indicating that when $t$ is sufficiently near $mT$ the investor prefers to borrow against the value of the alternative asset rather than incur the liquidation cost.

**Net certainty equivalent wealth.** Panels A and B of Figure 5 plot net certainty equivalent wealth $q(w)$ and net marginal value of liquid wealth $q'(w)$, respectively, for the case of $n = 1$ at time $t = 0$. Compared with the case of $n \to \infty$ shown in Figure 2, the rebalancing boundaries are shifted to the right. Recall that $0.54 \leq w \leq 2.64$ for $n = \infty$ as compared to $0.78 \leq w \leq 2.98$ for $n = 1$. This is because the cost of illiquidity is greater and hence the demand for the liquid asset increases. Aside from the changes in the rebalancing boundaries, the results in Figure 5 are generally similar to those for the $n \to \infty$ case.

**Intermediate cases with $n = 3, 6,$ and 12.** Figure A1 extends the results in Figure 5 to cases with $n = 3, 6,$ and 12. As $n$ increases, the rebalancing boundaries shift to the left, indicating that the investor becomes more comfortable holding the illiquid asset as the time span between automatic liquidity events decreases. Aside from the rebalancing boundaries, the lines both panels are essentially identical, by the continuity argument in $n$ and the fact that the solutions for $n = 1$ and $n = \infty$ are close. Given this similarity, for the remainder of the paper we report results using $\delta_A$ instead of $\delta_T$.

### 5.3. Comparative statics

Table 5 reports the calibrated results. As shown earlier, because of the transaction costs the model generates distinct feasible output values along the entire range of $(w, \overline{w})$. For ease of interpretation, we do not report a range of possible outputs. Instead, we report
Figure 5: Panels A and B plot investors’ net certainty equivalent wealth $q(w) = p(w) - w$ and net marginal value of liquid wealth $q'(w)$ as functions of the liquidity ratio $w$, respectively. The input parameter values are given in Table 4. For this figure, we set $n = 1$, $T = 6$, and $\delta_T = 21.34\%$. The blue solid lines show results for the general case within the optimal rebalancing boundaries $\underline{w} = 0.78$ and $\overline{w} = 2.98$. The red dot shows the solution under full spanning, which involves a static optimal $w^* = 1.25$ and $q^* = 1.20$. 
comparative static results for only the case of \( \hat{w} \) (as shown in Figure 3), as it is easier to report a single number and moreover this number gives the highest possible utility for the investor. Panel A shows results for the general case, in which the alternative asset is illiquid. For comparison, Panel B shows results for the case of full spanning. The rows in bold font show results using the baseline parameter values summarized in Table 4.

For the general case, the baseline parameters imply the investor allocates 53.93% of net worth \((N)\) to public equity, 34.48% to alternative assets, and the remaining 11.59% to bonds. These values are similar to the equal weighted average endowment fund portfolio allocations found in the data (see Table 1), which has allocations of 50.7% to public equity, 28.3% to alternative assets, and 21.0% to bonds. In the case of full spanning, the model implies approximately a 10 percentage point higher allocation to alternative assets. Additionally, the case of full spanning implies a much more volatile portfolio rebalancing strategy due to perfect liquidity and no transaction costs. The spending rate is slightly higher in the case of full spanning due to the greater liquidity.

5.3.1. The effect of \( \alpha \)

Table 5 reports the comparative static effect of varying the \( \alpha \) of the alternative asset. As \( \alpha \) increases the implied allocations to alternative assets and the spending rate both rise as well. Intuitively, as \( \alpha \) increases the economic value of the portfolio is greater and thus the spending rate rises due to the wealth effect.

Table 5 shows that asset allocations are quite sensitive to changes in \( \alpha \). For example, increasing \( \alpha \) from 2% to 3% increases the alternative asset allocation from 34.48% to 60.24%. As the investor allocates more to the alternative asset, they reduce allocations to public equity from 53.93% to 37.91% to manage the overall portfolio \( \beta \) and because of the additional liquidity risk. With an even higher \( \alpha \) of 4%, the investor will optimally
Table 5: The Effect of $\alpha$ on Asset Allocation and Spending Rates

This table reports the asset allocation out of total net worth $N = W + A$. The three columns, Public Equity, Alternative Assets (Alternative), and Bonds report $\Pi/N$, $A/N$, and $(W - \Pi)/N$, respectively, evaluated at $\hat{w}$, highlighted in Figure 3. Summing up across these three columns for each row equals 100%. The Spending column reports $C/N$. Panel A reports results for the case with illiquidity. Panel B reports results for the case of full spanning. The baseline parameter values are: $r = \zeta = 4\%$, $\mu_S = 10\%$, $\sigma_S = 20\%$, $\gamma = 1/\psi = 2$, $\alpha = 2\%$, $\epsilon = 15\%$, $\beta_A = 0.6$, $\theta_L = 0.1$, $\theta_X = 0.02$, $\delta_A = 0.04$, $n \to \infty$, which implies $\rho = 0.625$, $\mu_A = 9.6\%$, and $\sigma_A = 19.2\%$. All results are presented in per cent (%), which are omitted for simplicity.

### A. The case when the alternative asset is illiquid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public Equity</th>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Bonds</th>
<th>Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 0%$</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 1%$</td>
<td>67.29</td>
<td>12.69</td>
<td>20.02</td>
<td>5.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 2%$</td>
<td><strong>53.93</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.48</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.59</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.32</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 3%$</td>
<td>37.91</td>
<td>60.24</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>5.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 4%$</td>
<td>20.41</td>
<td>87.72</td>
<td>-8.12</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. The case of full spanning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public Equity</th>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Bonds</th>
<th>Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 0%$</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 1%$</td>
<td>61.67</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>16.11</td>
<td>5.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 2%$</td>
<td><strong>48.33</strong></td>
<td><strong>44.44</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.22</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.35</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 3%$</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>-1.67</td>
<td>5.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 4%$</td>
<td>21.67</td>
<td>88.89</td>
<td>-10.56</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
borrow 8.12% of net worth to invest in the alternative asset. It is worth noting that some endowment funds, such as Harvard, have occasionally taken on debt to invest in public and private equities. For example, during the financial crisis period, Harvard chose not to liquidate its endowment but rather to issue bonds (see Ang (2012)).

The sensitivity of the implied portfolio allocations to changes in $\alpha$ is consistent with the large cross-sectional dispersion in endowment funds’ allocations to alternative assets, shown in Table 2. An $\alpha$ of 0% can explain non-participation in alternative assets, while an $\alpha$ of 3% implies allocations that are broadly consistent with those of large endowments such as Yale and Stanford. Thus, with reasonable parameter values, our model is consistent with both the average allocations and also the cross-sectional dispersion of allocations to alternative assets.

The sensitivity of allocations to $\alpha$ is also consistent with the empirically observed strong relation between endowment fund size and allocations to alternative assets. Lerner, Schoar, and Wang (2008), Brown, Garlappi, and Tiu (2010), Barber and Wang (2013), and Ang, Ayala, and Goetzmann (2014) find that large endowment funds persistently earn significant alphas, which they attribute to superior alternative asset investments, while small endowments do not earn significant alphas. Lerner, Schoar, and Wang (2008) discuss how large endowments typically have better investment committees, better access to elite managers, and that there may be economies of scale in selecting alternative assets.

5.3.2. The effects of unspanned volatility $\epsilon$, risk aversion $\gamma$ and the EIS $\psi$

The effect of unspanned volatility $\epsilon$. Panel A of Table 6 shows that the unspanned volatility of the alternative asset has a large effect on allocations. If $\epsilon = 5\%$ the investor takes unrealistic, large short positions in both public equity and bonds (64.96% and 62.31%, respectively), and allocates 227.27% of the portfolio to the alternative asset,
because a 2% alpha is high compensation for the 5% unspanned volatility. However, when $\epsilon$ increases to 15% the investor allocates only 34.48% of the portfolio to the alternative asset and 53.93% to public equity.

**The effect of risk aversion $\gamma$.** Panel B of Table 6 shows that the coefficient of relative risk aversion has an overwhelmingly large effect on asset allocation. For a fixed EIS of $\psi = 0.5$, if risk aversion decreases from $\gamma = 2$ to $\gamma = 1$ the investor increases the portfolio allocation to alternative assets from 34.5% to 53.8%. Even more strikingly, the investor changes the portfolio allocation to the risk-free asset from a long position of 11.6% to a short position (borrowing 66.5% of net worth). As a result, the investor increase the portfolio allocation to public equity from 54% to a levered position (11.28% of net worth). As risk aversion increases from $\gamma = 2$ to $\gamma = 4$, allocations to bonds significantly increase from 11.2% to 55.4% of the portfolio; allocations to alternative assets decrease by about half from 34.5% to 17.4% and allocations to public equity decrease from 53.9% to 27.1%.

**The effect of the EIS $\psi$.** Panel C of Table 6 shows that varying the EIS has very large quantitative effects on the spending rate. In this panel, we fix risk aversion at $\gamma = 2$, a widely used value. An investor who is unwilling to substitute spending over time (e.g., $\psi = 0.1$) has a spending rate of 6.36%, which is on the relatively high end (in light of the permanent-income argument). In contrast, an investor who is willing to substitute consumption over time, (e.g., $\psi = 2$ which is widely used in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and the long-run risk literature), has a spending rate of only 1.33%. The intuition is that an investor with a high EIS defers spending to exploit the investment opportunity.

As the EIS increases, the investor increases allocations to illiquid alternative assets by cutting allocations to the liquid asset classes (public equity and bonds). For example, an
Table 6: The Effect of $\epsilon$ and $\gamma$ on Asset Allocation and Spending Rates

This table reports the asset allocation out of total net worth $N = W + A$. The three columns, Public Equity, Alternative Assets (Alternative), and Bonds report $\Pi/N$, $A/N$, and $(W-\Pi)/N$, respectively, evaluated at $\hat{w}$, highlighted in Figure 3. Summing up across these three columns for each row equals 100%. The Spending column reports $C/N$. The baseline parameter values are: $r = \zeta = 4\%$, $\mu_S = 10\%$, $\sigma_S = 20\%$, $\gamma = 2$, $\psi = 0.5$, $\alpha = 2\%$, $\epsilon = 15\%$, $\beta_A = 0.6$, $\theta_L = 0.1$, $\theta_X = 0.02$, $\delta_A = 0.04$, $n \to \infty$, which implies $\rho = 0.625$, $\mu_A = 9.6\%$, and $\sigma_A = 19.2\%$. All results are presented in per cent (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Unspanned volatility (with $\beta_A = 0.6$)</th>
<th>Public Equity</th>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Bonds</th>
<th>Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 5%$</td>
<td>-64.96</td>
<td>227.27</td>
<td>-62.31</td>
<td>6.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 15%$</td>
<td>53.93</td>
<td>34.48</td>
<td>11.59</td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 25%$</td>
<td>68.10</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>20.58</td>
<td>5.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Risk aversion (with $\psi = 0.5$)</th>
<th>Public Equity</th>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Bonds</th>
<th>Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 1$</td>
<td>112.75</td>
<td>53.76</td>
<td>-66.51</td>
<td>6.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 2$</td>
<td>53.93</td>
<td>34.48</td>
<td>11.59</td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 4$</td>
<td>27.21</td>
<td>17.36</td>
<td>55.43</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. EIS (with $\gamma = 2$)</th>
<th>Public Equity</th>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Bonds</th>
<th>Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\psi = 0.1$</td>
<td>56.20</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>13.03</td>
<td>6.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi = 0.5$</td>
<td>53.93</td>
<td>34.48</td>
<td>11.59</td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi = 1$</td>
<td>50.47</td>
<td>40.16</td>
<td>9.37</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi = 2$</td>
<td>44.39</td>
<td>50.25</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
investor with $\psi = 0.1$ allocates 56% of net worth to public equity and 31% to alternatives, compared to an investor with $\psi = 2$ who allocates 44% to public equity and 50% to illiquid alternatives. A high EIS increases the investors willingness to shift consumption across periods, which allows a high EIS investor to respond to return shocks by deferring consumption rather than engaging in costly liquidation of the alternative asset. This is in contrast to the case of full spanning, where changes in the EIS do not affect asset allocation (see equations (C.2 and (C.3)).

Our model-implied results for the relation between spending flexibility and portfolio liquidity are consistent with empirical facts. Hayes, Primbs, and Chiquoine (2015) argue that pension funds have little spending flexibility and family offices have a great deal of flexibility. Rose and Seligman (2016) find that the average allocation to alternative assets for public pension plans is only 3.3%. In contrast, a UBS/Campden survey found that family offices hold more than 50% of their wealth in illiquid asset classes. Over a medium or long horizon, the combined effect of a high EIS - reducing spending and tilting investments towards illiquid alternatives which deliver alpha - will have a significant impact on the accumulation of net worth.

6. Conclusion

We analyze dynamic spending and asset allocation decisions for a long-term institutional investor, such as university endowments, by incorporating an illiquid investment opportunity, not spanned by public equity, into an otherwise standard Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) framework. The investor can voluntarily liquidate a part of the alternative asset holding prior to maturity by incurring a proportional transaction cost and can also increase alternative asset holdings at any time by paying a proportional acquisition cost.

\footnote{See \url{http://www.globalfamilyofficereport.com/investments/}.}
The investor also benefits from liquidity diversification by holding alternative assets maturing at different dates. We calibrate our model and show that our model’s quantitative implications are broadly consistent with both the level and cross-sectional variation in alternative asset allocations by university endowment funds.

Our model provides guidelines for an institutional investor making spending and asset allocation decisions. Our theory justifies the substantial allocations to alternative assets, as advocated by Swensen’s Endowment Model, if the alternative asset can generate an expected risk-adjusted excess return of 2-3% (with public equity as the benchmark), with moderate levels of unspanned volatility, and standard values of risk aversion for investors (e.g., around two or three). However, investors with limited access to sufficiently high (net-of-fees) alphas should hold conventional portfolios as suggested by MPT.

Due to space considerations we have not included several quantitatively interesting generalizations. For example, stochastic calls and distributions are potentially important as they create uncertainty about the precise timing of cash flows making illiquid alternative assets less attractive, ceteris paribus. Extending the model to allow for time-variation in the liquidation cost is also an interesting direction for future research, particularly given the rise in illiquidity observed during the financial crisis.
Appendices

A Public Equity and Bonds with No Alternatives

First, we summarize the Markowitz-Merton MPT with no illiquid alternative assets. In this classic framework, investors have the standard investment opportunities defined by the public equity’s risky return process given by (1) and a risk-free bond that pays a constant rate of interest \( r \). Investors dynamically adjust their consumption/spending and frictionlessly rebalance their portfolios. The following proposition summarizes the main results in Merton (1971).

**Proposition 2** The optimal spending \( C_t \) is proportional to wealth \( W_t \): 
\[
C_t = \phi_1 W_t 
\]
where 
\[
\phi_1 = \zeta + (1 - \psi) \left( r - \zeta + \frac{\eta_S^2}{2\gamma} \right) 
\]
(A.1)
is the constant marginal propensity to consume (MPC). Investors allocate a constant fraction, denoted by \( \pi \), of their wealth \( W_t \) to public equity, i.e., the total investment amount in public equity is \( \Pi = \pi W \) where 
\[
\pi = \eta_S / (\gamma \sigma_S) = (\mu_S - r) / (\gamma \sigma_S^2). 
\]
The investor’s value function 
\[
J(W) = \frac{(b_1 W)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}, 
\]
(A.2)
where \( b_1 \) is a constant given by:
\[
b_1 = \zeta \psi^\gamma \phi_1^{1-\psi}. 
\]
(A.3)

Note that the asset allocation rule is the standard Merton mean-variance result in that the fraction of investment in public equity increases in the equity risk premium \( (\mu_S - r) \) and decreases in variance \( \sigma_S^2 \) and risk aversion \( \gamma \). Next, we analyze the general case where investors can also invest in illiquid alternative assets in addition to public equity and bonds.

B Proof for Proposition 1

**Optimal Policy Functions and PDE for** \( p(w, t) \). We conjecture that the value function \( V(W, A, t) \) takes the following form:
\[
V(W, A, t) = \frac{(b_1 P(W, A, t))^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} = \frac{(b_1 p(w, t) A)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}, 
\]
where \( b_1 \) is given in (A.3). And then substituting it into the FOCs for the optimal consumption given in (16) and optimal investment in public equity given in (17), respectively, and immediately we have the scaled consumption rule is (25) and the allocation to public equity is (26). Finally, substituting the conjectured value function given in (B.1) and the policy rules for \( c \) in (25) and \( \pi \) (26) into the HJB equation (15), and after some algebras we have the certainty equivalent wealth \( p(w, t) \) satisfies the PDE (27).
**Lower boundary.** As mentioned earlier in the main text, \((W_t, A_t)\) are denoted as the investor’s pre-liquidation holdings in public equity and the alternative asset at time \(t\), and \((W'_t, A'_t)\) is defined as the investor’s post-liquidation position, where \(W'_t = W_t + (1 - \theta_L)\Delta\) and \(A'_t = A_t - \Delta\), and \(\Delta > 0\) is the unit of the alternative asset that the investor is considering to voluntarily liquidate. And then following the continuity of value function upon the liquidation at the lower liquidation boundary \(W_t\), we have

\[
P(W'_t, A'_t, t) = P(W_t, A_t, t),
\]

(B.2)

Further, by taking the limit for the equation (B.2), it follows

\[
\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{1 - \theta_L}{(1 - \theta_L)\Delta} \left( P(W_t + (1 - \theta_L)\Delta, A_t, t) - P(W_t, A_t, t) \right) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{1}{\Delta} \left( P(W_t + (1 - \theta_L)\Delta, A_t, t) - P(W_t + (1 - \theta_L)\Delta, A_t - \Delta, t) \right).
\]

Using differentiability, we have

\[
(1 - \theta_L)P_W(W_t, A_t, t) = P_A(W_t, A_t, t).
\]

By substituting \(P(W_t, A_t, t) = p(w_t, t)A_t\) into the equation above, we have

\[
(1 - \theta_L)p(w_t, t) = p(w_t, t) - p_w(w_t, t)w_t.
\]

Further simplifying, we can show that (28) holds at \(\overline{w_t}\).

**Upper boundary.** We use essentially the same argument as that for the lower boundary. Let \((W_t, A_t)\) denote the pre-acquisition position in public equity and the alternative asset at time \(t\). As the acquisition cost for the alternative asset is \(\theta_X\) per unit of the asset, the investor’s post-acquisition position is then \((W'_t, A'_t)\), where \(W'_t = W_t - (1 + \theta_X)\Delta, A'_t = A_t + \Delta\), and \(\Delta > 0\) denotes the unit of the alternative asset that the investor considers to acquire voluntarily. The continuity of the value function implies \(P(W'_t, A'_t, t) = P(W_t, A_t, t)\), which implicitly defines the upper boundary \(\overline{W_t}\) as a function of \(A_t\) at time \(t\). Similarly, in the differential form, we obtain

\[
(1 + \theta_X)P_W(W_t, A_t, t) = P_A(W_t, A_t, t).
\]

By substituting \(P(W_t, A_t, t) = p(w_t, t)A_t\) into the equation above, we have

\[
(1 + \theta_X)p_w(w_t, t) = p(w_t, t) - p_w(w_t, t)w_t,
\]

which means (29) holds at \(\overline{w_t}\).
C Full Spanning with Liquid Alternative Asset

In this appendix, we summarize the full-spanning case where the alternative asset is fully liquid. In this case, the alternative asset simply expands the investors’ investment opportunity set by adding a second liquid risky asset. Therefore, the optimization problem boils down to Merton’s model with two publicly traded risky assets. As this new risky asset provides diversification and incurs no costs, the value function for this case is clearly higher than in the general case with illiquid alternatives. Indeed, it serves as an upper bound for the investor’s value function with illiquid alternatives. Below, we summarize the main results for this frictionless benchmark.

The optimal consumption $C$ is proportional to the net worth, $N$: $C = \phi_2 N$ where the MPC, denoted by $\phi_2$, is given by

$$\phi_2 = \zeta + (1 - \psi) \left[ r - \zeta + \frac{\eta_S^2 - 2\rho \eta_S \eta_A + \eta_A^2}{2\gamma(1 - \rho^2)} \right]. \quad (C.1)$$

By comparing $\phi_2$ given in (C.1) and $\phi_1$ given in (A.1), we see that diversification ($|\rho| < 1$) and an additional risk premium $\eta_A > 0$ both influence the MPC. At each time $t$, the investor continuously rebalances the portfolio so the investment in public equity, $\Pi$, and in the alternative asset, $A$, are proportional to net worth $N$, i.e.

$$\Pi = \frac{\eta_S - \rho \eta_A}{\sigma_S \gamma (1 - \rho^2)} N, \quad (C.2)$$
$$A = \frac{\alpha}{\gamma \psi^2} N, \quad (C.3)$$

The remaining wealth, $N - (\Pi + A)$, is allocated to the risk-free bond.

The investor’s value function $\overline{V}(N)$ is given by

$$\overline{V}(N) = \frac{(b_2 N)^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} = J((b_2/b_1) N), \quad (C.4)$$

where $b_2$ is a constant given by

$$b_2 = \zeta \psi^{\frac{1}{1 - \psi}} \phi_2^{\frac{1}{1 - \psi}}, \quad (C.5)$$

and $J(\cdot)$ is the value function given in (A.2) for an investor who only has access to public equity and bonds.

By introducing a new risky (alternative) asset into the investment opportunity set, the investor is better off because $b_2 > b_1$. The second equality in (C.4) implies that $b_2/b_1 - 1$ is the fraction of wealth that the investor would need as compensation to permanently give up the opportunity to invest in the liquid alternative asset and instead live under the Merton model with public equity and risk-free asset only.

**Proof for the Case of Full Spanning with the Liquid Alternative Asset.** Using the standard dynamic programming method, we have

$$0 = \max_{C,\Pi,A} f(C,\overline{V}) + \left[ rN + (\mu_S - r)\Pi + (\mu_A - r)A - C \right] \overline{V}_N$$

$$+ \left( \Pi \sigma_S^2 + 2 \rho \Pi \sigma_S A \sigma_A + (A \sigma_A)^2 \right) \overline{V}_{NN}, \quad (C.6)$$

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and using the FOCs for $\Pi$, $A$ and $C$, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
    f_C(C, V) &= V_N, \quad (C.7) \\
    \Pi &= -\frac{\eta S}{\sigma S} \frac{V_N}{V_{NN}} - \frac{\rho \sigma_A}{\sigma A} A, \quad (C.8) \\
    A &= -\frac{\eta_A}{\sigma_A} \frac{V_N}{V_{NN}} - \frac{\rho \sigma_S}{\sigma A} \Pi. \quad (C.9)
\end{align*}
\]

We conjecture and verify that the value function takes the following form

\[
V(N) = \frac{(b_2 N)^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma}. \quad (C.10)
\]

Substituting it into the FOCs, we have $C = \zeta \psi b_2^{1-\psi} N$, (C.2) and (C.3). Then substituting them into the HJB equation (C.6) and simplifying, we obtain (C.1).

**D Inputs for Calculating Unspanned Volatility**

**Table A1: Summary of Asset Class Risk and Correlations**

This table shows summary statistics for the sub-asset classes within the illiquid asset class, which are used to calculate the unspanned volatility of the endowment fund portfolios. Panel A shows $\beta_a$, $R^2_a$, and $\sigma_a$ for each alternative asset class $a$. Panel B shows the pairwise correlations between these sub-asset classes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A</th>
<th>$\beta_a$</th>
<th>$R^2_a$</th>
<th>$\sigma_a$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hedge Funds (HF)</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Equity (PrivEqu)</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venture Capital (VC)</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Real Estate (PrivRE)</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural Resources (NatRes)</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B</th>
<th>FixedInc</th>
<th>PubEqu</th>
<th>HF</th>
<th>PrivEqu</th>
<th>VC</th>
<th>PrivRE</th>
<th>NatRes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PubEqu</td>
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<td>HF</td>
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</tr>
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<td>PrivEqu</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC</td>
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<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>PrivRE</td>
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<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>NatRes</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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E Calibration of $\delta_A$ and $\delta_T$

We focus on the steady state in which the investor always has $n$ funds at any time $t$. This is feasible provided the investor immediately replaces each fund that exits.

To simplify exposition, assume that each fund’s payoff structure involves only one contribution at its inception and one distribution upon its exit, and the horizon (or equivalently the lockup period) of each fund is $H$. At the steady state, $n/H$ funds mature each year, which means that there is one liquidity event every $T = H/n$ years. For example, if the lockup period for each fund is $H = 6$ and there are three funds at the steady state $(n = 3)$, then every two years ($T = 6/3 = 2$) an automatic liquidity event occurs. To ensure that the investor has three funds at the steady state, the investor immediately replaces the exited fund by investing in a new fund with 6-year lock-up.

To ensure growth stationarity, we assume that both the growth rate of each fund, $g_A$, and the growth rate of the inception size for each fund (vintage), $g_I$, are constant. Consider a vintage-$t$ fund, which refers to the fund that enters the portfolio at time $t$. Let $IS_t$ denote the fund’s initial size (IS) at inception. Its size at $(t + iT)$ is then $e^{g_AiT} IS_t$ where $i = 1, 2, \ldots, n$ and hence the fund’s size when exiting at time $t + H$ is $e^{g_AH} IS_t$.

At time $(t + H)$ the investor holds a total of $n$ illiquid alternative funds ranging from vintage-$t$ to vintage-$(t + (n - 1)T)$. Note that the value of the vintage-$(t + i)$ fund is $e^{g_A(n-i+1)T} \times (IS_te^{g_I(i-1)T})$ as its inception size is $IS_te^{g_I(i-1)T}$ and has grown at the rate of $g_A$ per year for $(n-i+1)T$ years. Summing across all vintages, we obtain

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} e^{g_A(n-i+1)T} \times (IS_te^{g_I(i-1)T}) = e^{g_IH} IS_t \times \sum_{i=1}^{n} e^{(g_A-g_I)iT}.$$ 

The net payout at time $(t + H)$ is given by the difference between $e^{g_AH} IS_t$, the size of the exiting vintage-$t$ fund, and $e^{g_IH} IS_t$, the size of the new vintage-$(t + H)$ fund. As the payout occurs once every $T$ years, the annualized net payout rate is then

$$\frac{1}{T} \left( e^{g_AH} IS_t - e^{g_IH} IS_t \right) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{i=1}^{n} e^{(g_A-g_I)iT} - \frac{1}{T} \sum_{i=1}^{n} e^{(g_I-g_A)iT}.$$

Next, we use this annualized net payout rate to calibrate $\delta_A$ and $\delta_T$. Although, for the sake of generality, the model includes both $\delta_A$ and $\delta_T$, in any single calibration we use only one of either $\delta_A$ or $\delta_T$. For the illustration, we provide three examples below.

First, consider the limiting case when $n \to \infty$, and with fixed finite holding period $H$ for each fund, $T \equiv H/n \to 0$. Therefore, the investor continuously receives payout at a constant rate. This maps to the parameter $\delta_A$ in our model. As one may expect, the net payout rate is simply the difference between the value of the incumbent fund growth rate $g_A$ and the growth of the new fund’s initial size $g_I$:

$$\delta_A = g_A - g_I.$$ (E.2)
For the calibration, we set $\mu_A = g_A = 9.6\%$ and $g_I = 5.6\%$ (approximately equal to the average endowment fund growth rate over the past 20 years) resulting in $\delta_A = 4\%$.

Second, consider the case when the investor has only one fund outstanding at each point in time. Then, $T = H$, the payout occurs once every $H$ years, and we can use $\delta_T$ to capture the payout. That is, when $T$ is relatively large, $\delta_T$ is given by

$$\delta_T = 1 - e^{-(g_A-g_I)T}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (E.3)

Note that $\delta_T$ as defined in the model is not annualized. Thus, with the values of $g_A$ and $g_I$ given above, for a single fund ($n = 1$) in the portfolio and $H = 6$, $\delta_T = 21.34\%$.

Third, consider an intermediate case when the investor has six funds at each point in time. Then, we have $T = H/n = 6/6 = 1$, and we could use $\delta_T = \delta_1 = 1 - e^{-0.04} = 3.92\%$ to capture the payout. Alternatively, we could approximate with a continuous constant dividend yield by annualizing $\delta_T$ and using this annualized value as $\delta_A$ in the calibration. In this case, we would have $\delta_A \approx (1 + \delta_T)^{1/T} - 1 = \delta_T = \delta_1 = 3.92\%$ when $T = 1$.

**F Cases with $n = 3, 6, \text{ and } 12$**

Figure A1 extends the results in Figure 4 to cases with $n = 3, 6, \text{ and } 12$. As $n$ increases, the rebalancing boundaries shift to the left, indicating that the investor becomes increasingly comfortable holding the illiquid asset as the time between automatic liquidity events decreases. Aside from the changes in the rebalancing boundaries, the lines in Panels A and B are essentially identical.
Figure A1: Panels A and B plot investors’ net certainty equivalent wealth \( q(w) = p(w) - w \) and net marginal value of liquid wealth \( q'(w) \) as functions of the liquidity ratio \( w \), respectively. The input parameter values are given in Table 4. The blue line shows results for \( n = 3, T = 2, \) and \( \delta_T = 7.69\% \). The red dashed line shows results for \( n = 6, T = 1, \) and \( \delta_T = 3.92\% \). The black dotted line shows results for \( n = 12, T = 0.5, \) and \( \delta_T = 1.98\% \).

References


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