Booth School of Business
University of Chicago
5807 S Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2017||Pledgeability, Industry Liquidity, and Financing Cycles|
with Douglas W. Diamond, Raghuram G. Rajan: w23055
Why are downturns following prolonged episodes of high valuations of firms so severe and long? Why do firms promise high external payments when they anticipate high valuations, and underperform subsequently? In this paper, we propose a theory of financing cycles where the control rights to enforce claims in an asset price boom (rights to sell assets) differ from the control rights used in more normal times (rights over cash flows that we term “pledgeability”). Firm management’s limited incentive to enhance pledgeability in an asset price boom can have long-drawn adverse effects in a downturn, which may not be resolved by renegotiation. This can also explain why involuntary asset turnover and asset misallocation to outsiders are high in a downturn, as well as why industry productivity fall...