Jane Street Capital
Roppongi 6-12-4, Minato-ku
Tokyo, Japan 106-0032
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|September 2010||Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations|
with Christina Aperjis, Richard J. Zeckhauser: w16423
In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations where the players meet but once. One player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to betray when trusted. The strength of the temptation to betray may vary from encounter to encounter, and is independently distributed over time and across temptees. We refer to a recorded betrayal as a black mark. We study how trusters and temptees interact in equilibrium when past influences current play only through its effect on certain summary statistics. We first focus on the case that players only condition on the number of black marks of a temptee and study the different equilibria that emerge, d...
Published: in "Games and Economic Behavior" Volume 87, September 2014, Pages 70–90 citation courtesy of