University of Notre Dame
434 Flanner Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|December 2016||Growth Policy, Agglomeration, and (the Lack of) Competition|
with Joseph P. Kaboski, Yao Amber Li: w22947
Industrial clusters are promoted by policy and generally viewed as good for growth and development, but both clusters and policies may also enable non-competitive behavior. This paper studies the presence of non-competitive pricing in geographic industrial clusters. We develop, validate, and apply a novel test for collusive behavior. We derive the test from the solution to a partial cartel of perfectly colluding firms in an industry. Outside of a cartel, a firm's markup depends on its market share, but in the cartel, markups across firms converge and depend instead on the total market share of the cartel. Empirically, we validate the test using plants with common owners, and then test for collusion using data from Chinese manufacturing firms (1999-2009). We find strong evidence for non-com...