Queen's School of Business
143 Union Street
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2014||Friends or Foes: The Interrelationship between Angel and Venture Capital Markets|
with Thomas F. Hellmann: w20147
This paper develops a theory of how angel and venture capital markets interact. Entrepreneurs first receive angel then venture capital funding. The two investor types are 'friends' in that they rely upon each other's investments. However, they are also 'foes', because at the later stage the venture capitalists no longer need the angels. Using a costly search model we derive the equilibrium deal flows across the two markets, endogenously deriving market sizes, competitive structures, valuation levels, and exit rates. We discuss how the model generates alternative testable hypotheses for the recent rise of angel investing.
Published: Hellmann, Thomas & Thiele, Veikko, 2015. "Friends or foes? The interrelationship between angel and venture capital markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 639-653. citation courtesy of
|October 2012||A Theory of the Firm based on Partner Displacement|
with Thomas F. Hellmann: w18495
We develop a new theory of the firm where asset owners sometimes want to change partners ex-post. The model identifies a fundamental trade-off between (i) a "displacement externality" under non-integration, where a partner leaves a relationship even though the benefit is worth less than the loss to the displaced partner, and (ii), a "retention externality" under integration, where a partner inefficiently retains the other. Renegotiation cannot eliminate these inefficiencies when agents are wealth constrained. When there is more asset specificity, displacement externalities matter more and retention externality less, so that integration becomes more attractive. Our model also predicts that integration always provides stronger incentives for specific investments, and that wealthy owners actu...