Department of Finance
Copenhagen Business School
Porcelænshaven 16A, 1
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|July 2015||Inattention and Inertia in Household Finance: Evidence from the Danish Mortgage Market|
with John Y. Campbell, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Tarun Ramadorai: w21386
A common problem in household finance is that households are often inactive in response to incentives. Mortgages are generally the largest household liability, and mortgage refinancing is an important channel for monetary policy transmission, so inactivity in this setting can be socially costly. We study how the Danish population responds to mortgage refinancing incentives between 2010 and 2014, building an empirical model that identifies two important sources of inactivity: inattention (a low probability of responding to a refinancing incentive in a given quarter), and inertia (a psychological addition to the financial cost of refinancing). Inertia is hump-shaped in age and generally increasing in socioeconomic status, while inattention is highest for older households and households with ...
|November 2014||Toward an Understanding of Reference-Dependent Labor Supply: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment|
with Alec Brandon, Uri Gneezy, John A. List: w20695
Perhaps the most powerful form of framing arises through reference dependence, wherein choices are made recognizing the starting point or a goal. In labor economics, for example, a form of reference dependence, income targeting, has been argued to represent a serious challenge to traditional economic models. We design a field experiment linked tightly to three popular economic models of labor supply—two behavioral variants and one simple neoclassical model—to deepen our understanding of the positive implications of our major theories. Consistent with neoclassical theory and reference-dependent preferences with endogenous reference points, workers (vendors in open air markets) supply more hours when presented with an expected transitory increase in hourly wages. In contrast with the predict...
|October 2012||Carrots that Look Like Sticks: Toward an Understanding of Multitasking Incentive Schemes|
with Omar Al-Ubaydli, Uri Gneezy, John A. List: w18453
Constructing compensation schemes for effort in multi-dimensional tasks is complex, particularly when some dimensions are not easily observable. When incentive schemes contractually reward workers for easily observed measures, such as quantity produced, the standard model predicts that unrewarded dimensions, such as quality, will be neglected. Yet, there remains mixed empirical evidence in favor of this standard principal-agent model prediction. This paper reconciles the literature by using both theory and empirical evidence. The theory outlines conditions under which principals can use a piece rate scheme to induce higher quantity and quality levels than analogous fixed wage schemes. Making use of a series of complementary laboratory and field experiments we show that this effect occurs b...
Published: Omar Al-Ubaydli & Steffen Andersen & Uri Gneezy & John A. List, 2015. "Carrots That Look Like Sticks: Toward an Understanding of Multitasking Incentive Schemes," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 538-561, January. citation courtesy of